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Abstract
Proper authentication is needed to avoid theft and destruction of data by unautho-
rized parties. This research proposes to add software biometrics to the authenti-
cation and verification process, using keystroke dynamics. The goal is to grant
or revoke users privileges by distinguishing one user’s typing pattern from an-
other. Login samples were recorded by monitoring keystroke parameters such as
KeyDown time and KeyWait time, in an 8 character password.
A system to generate user profiles, with the ability to accommodate continuous
growth, was developed. By using appropriate Alert Levels, a 2.25% False Ac-
ceptance Rate and 4.17% False Rejection Rate was achieved. A method to rec-
ognize and identify users, based on one login sample, was able to trace 65% of
the samples back to the original user. The work in this thesis was unable to find
an applicable method for statistical pattern recognition. It concludes that by en-
abling a biometric keystroke dynamic authentication system, 97.75% of all false
login attempts, with stolen but valid credentials, can be prevented, although with
a potential downside of increasing the number of falsely rejected logins by 4.17%.
However, as users grow accustomed to their password, the false rejection rate will
go down and the system will increase in reliability. Password DoS attacks as well
as automated dictionary attacks will be prevented, but a potential increase in ad-
ministration cost is probable because of altered user behavior due to physical or
environmental changes.
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A paper titled “Using Alert Levels to enhance Keystroke Dynamic Authentica-
tion” based on this thesis is currently being written. It will be submitted to NIK
(Norsk Informatikkonferanse) by 14th of June 2007. The conference will be held
in Oslo 19th to 21st of November 2007.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Authentication of users have been conducted for as long as control of access has
been needed. The use of computers and computer systems has been rapidly grow-
ing over the last decade, and the need for proper authentication and identification
has increased accordingly. Every day vast amounts of sensitive data is maintained
by, and transmitted between computer systems. Protection and confidentiality has
become more and more important. Compromised user accounts lead to unwanted
unauthorized access. The Gartner IT Security Summit 2006 raises insider threats
from employees and partners as the number one security threat. Increased focus
has been dedicated to attacks coming from inside the organization; behind security
features like firewalls and intrusion detection systems. It has been shown that at-
tacks occurring from inside the layers of security protection, are the ones causing
highest financial damage. Internal threats, whether they are malicious or simply
the result of human error, are the hardest to detect, most financially damaging and
the most commonly occurring type of security violation [2].
Internal intruders often have some authority, but seek to gain additional access,
or to take action without legitimate authorization [3]. This implies the usage of
non-acceptable or uncommon use of privileges compared to the historical profile
of the user or the users group/position. Spoofing attacks, password stealing or
session high-jacking are all examples of authorization misuse.
Authentication is the process of validating a user (for example verifying the users
identity), in order to set privileges based on a policy. This process is often con-
ducted before a session is created, using a user-name and password combination.
To strengthen security, implementations of biometrics can help the process of user
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validation. However this is an expensive technical and administrative process, and
might introduce ethical issues. Classic biometric procedures includes physical
identification via fingerprints, retina scans or other matching processes. This has
proved to be effective for validating physical entry, but electronically data can be
crafted without any system being able to detect it. This is a problem [4].
1.1 Motivation
To provide sufficient confidentiality and integrity in data and information, differ-
ent identification techniques are used to authenticate users; typically, and histori-
cally, through username and password schemes. One user is given one username
and one password. Traditionally the username has been used as the user identifi-
cation credential. Privileges in the system (such as access to files and services) is
defined for each username (or user group). The username usually remains open to
everyone. To authenticate a user the password is kept secret. The trust relationship
between a user and a system is based on the selecting the appropriate username,
assuming that the password is secret.
When selecting a password policy both security and user convenience is taken
into account due to several issues. A password can be guessed and thus enabling
unauthorized access. There are features created to face these issues (for exam-
ple locking access after 3 failed attempts, short password expiration time, single-
use passwords and password restrictions). Generating passwords or implementing
policies which makes the password hard to remember can lead to a security breach
[5, 6], as users choose convenience over security (for example putting the pass-
word on a sticker easily available) [7, 6].
There are multiple techniques an attacker could use to gain a password.
• Encrypting a password is a feature used to prevent network password sniff-
ing, where malicious users take use of tools to look at packet content in
hope of finding passwords in clear text sent between host and authenticator
[8].
• Even encrypted passwords is exploited by attackers using password crack-
ing techniques, such as dictionary attacks to generate encrypted code and in
so finding the password. Weak passwords suffer from successful dictionary
attacks.
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• Brute force attacks, where the attacker tries every possible password, is time
consuming, but will inevitably succeed in finding the password.
• Social engineering is when an attacker exploit human beings into giving
a password on false basis. For example posing as someone else over the
phone or e-mail.
Authentication through user-password schemes is widely used and has a high se-
curity breach potential. Biometric methods using unique personal features have
been implemented to strengthen the process. In the area of physical access con-
trol, biometrics have been found to be successful. Biometric systems (such as iris
scans, fingerprints, voice recognition, physical chips or cards, blood samples and
face recognition) have been developed with promise of closing this security gap.
Some of the problems these technologies have faced are scalability, deployability
and cost. A fair bit of administration is also included in such solutions. Elec-
tronic access control have not been as successful as physical access control using
biometrics.
When a session is successfully authenticated most systems have no approach to re-
authenticate a user. This enables scenarios like session highjacking and perimeter
possession (for example taking over a terminal which has been authenticated). The
trust in the user knowing the password does not catch a password theft scenario.
As the threat of inside attacks (users already falsely authenticated) increase the
demand for better and more secure techniques during and after authentication is
sought after.
Using biometrics to add an extra layer to the existing security setup, may catch
anomalous behavior in situations where one previously had no means of discovery.
Issues like session highjacking, password theft and perimeter possession, are all
such threats. Research presented to affront especially scalability, but also cost,
include (but does not exclude to), software biometric systems. The idea is to
find specific user patterns through machine learning processes, and add this to
a verification process. Keystroke dynamics is one area where research has been
showing positive results. It could be one way to accurately identify or verify
users, using statistical methods to compare the typing pattern of an authenticating
user with a known user profile. Keystroke dynamics could be beneficial in user
identification during sessions, not only under a login sequence. Studies indicate
that users given proper data, could be accurately identified without the use of
username and passwords.
This study makes an effort in using keystroke dynamic in the phases of authenti-
17
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cation and verification of users. It also makes a comparison to previous research.
1.2 Goals
This thesis will focus on keystroke dynamics as a feasible feature in the exist-
ing security policy by using techniques to identify users in an authentication pro-
cess to harden passwords and reduce security breaches. The next step would be
to re-authenticate a user during an authenticated session, determining if the user
behavior is likely to belong to the authenticated user. Finally to make a good
identification of the real user falsely authenticated through another account.
Using a combination of elements in keystroke authentication through properties
like active and passive listening, keystroke latency, known keystroke combina-
tion times and general typing behavior. Creating user profiles on single stroke,
password input phase (content known typing pattern) and free text typing, enables
statistical studies making joint parameter user identification to give accurate de-
tection rates.
1.3 Hypothesis
• Every user has a specific typing pattern that can be profiled and used for
comparison to strengthen authentication
• The authentication process could be implemented using biometrics: It is not
what you do, but how you do it, that defines who you are
• Keystroke dynamics can be used to strengthen the authentication of user
login sequences
• Users conducting out-of-profile, can be detected and identified during au-
thentication, using profile mining techniques
18
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1.4 Contribution
The novelty of this work consists of several parts. The parameter KeyWait is the
time span between one key is pressed down, until the next key is pressed down.
This makes it impossible to get negative numbers, and will be more stable and
easier to work with then earlier definitions of the waiting time between keys in
related work.
One key aspect of this work is the usage of Alert Levels, which enables admin-
istrators of the system to adjust the strictness by altering one parameter setting.
As profiles grow or users get more consistent, the Alert Level can be decreased,
making the implementation flexible and able to more easily handle anomalies in
user behavior. No previous work known to the author have had a flexible, and
granular, solution at this level using keystroke dynamics.
1.5 Document Structure
This document will be structured as follows: The Background chapter contains
previous related work, a literature survey of the topic, and explanations of the
terminology. The Method chapter typically describe the setup of tests conducted,
as well as explaining why solutions were chosen or discarded. It also contains
sections referring to the application, the parameters and profiling. The Results
chapter go through the steps taken in the tests and alterations done in order to
improve results.
This document will discuss and conclude the findings in the Conclusion chapter,
discussing interesting elements in the findings and suggests some future work.
Hereafter follows an Appendix and Bibliography.
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Chapter 2
Background
The growth of the Internet has changed computer confidentiality, integrity and
availability severely, as the number of users and amount of sensitive data has
grown rapidly. Areas such as authentication, cryptography and general security
has received an increasing amount of scientific focus to address these matters.
2.1 Terms
The section A in the Appendix presents an overview of technical terms for com-
puter security and biometrics used in this research and the referenced papers. The
section 4.8.3 define result parameters used for describing results and accuracy of
tests.
2.2 Classification - Security Measures
Dieter Gollmann defines integrity as: “No user of the system, even if authorized,
may be permitted to modify data items in such a way that assets or accounting
records are lost or corrupted”. and “prevention of unauthorized disclosure of in-
formation”, as the definition of confidentiality [3].
These basic objects were all founding stones in the early childhood of Intrusion
21
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Detection first introduced by Denning [9] in 1985. It is desirable for administra-
tors to monitor the activity in their networks, to detect and counteract unauthorized
activity, but due to the burden of logfile and auditdata file sizes, automated mon-
itoring system tools emerged. Tools designed to fight these issues are referred to
as Intrusion Detection Systems(IDS). IDS can be separated into two categories:
Host Intrusion Detection Systems (HIDS) and Network Intrusion Detection Sys-
tems (NIDS).
2.2.1 Intrusion Detection, Anomaly Detection and Authentica-
tion
There are many types of NIDS, but they generally focus on packets pattern recog-
nition, either in packet headers, packet data or packet inter-arrival time. The fire-
wall is a general term used for this kind of an easy NIDS, however a firewall
differs as it does not analyze log-files, but does run actively while packets arrive.
HIDS have recently been given increasing emphasis due to the growth of inside
network threats [10] and unauthorized activity from internal intruders such as dis-
gruntled employees, people abusing their privileges for personal gain and various
types of industrial espionage. With External Intruders one often refer to users
with no authorized access to the system they attack. Internal intruders have some
authority (either physically or in the system), but seek to gain additional ability to
take action without legitimate authorization.
HIDS faces the challenge of detecting abnormal system behavior based on prior
knowledge of system behavior/activity. Within a host-based Intrusion System a
distinction can be made between approaches that model human behavior versus
indirect interaction. The interaction uses have with the host can be monitored
and profiled in order to re-authenticate a user. Especially important and useful
in situations where abnormal user behavior and/or activity can point toward a
security breach.
IDS are countermeasures assigned to protect and recover your assets and/or re-
cover from the hazardous and vulnerable state. Anomaly detection will be referred
to as a method to detect not nominal or normal behavior of traffic [11].
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2.2.2 Authentication and Verification
In computer security, authentication is known to be the identification and veri-
fication process before a user attains privileges on a system. Often this is done
through a log in process or exchanging secrets. Once a user is authenticated, the
access to specific resources will be given based on his credentials. Once authenti-
cated, there exists next to no widespread system to make sure the user is the real
person claimed through the login process. Some few applications have periodi-
cal authentication forced upon the user, other attempt to learn the behavior of the
specific user, to automatically detect unusual patterns deviating from the histor-
ical behavior. Introducing methods to authenticate users after an authentication
process has been successfully made, is called re-authentication.
Situations where, for some reason, authentication has been given to someone else
than assumed (for example password hack, session hijack or console/perimeter
hijack), a re-authentication system would ideally detect a different user pattern
than expected from the user. If the deviation is strong enough, reactions to this
can be put into place, such as forced logout, quarantine user or privilege removal.
IDS techniques are Anomaly based detection / Statistical Approach and Signature
based detection / Specification approach [12, 13, 14]. They differ as anomaly
detection systems have the promise to detect new kind of attacks, while signature
based recognizes already identified treats.
Profiles can be built (or grown) through a machine learning process, and current
behavior is used to compare against the defined behavior in this profile.
2.3 Historical Results
Nulluri and Kar [13] define the four objectives of a IDS as Monitor and Analyze,
Recognize, Compare data and Raise alerts. Historically the second objective has
been the primary attribute of research. Another vital motivation for research is the
ability to reduce the amount of false positives and false negatives. A false positive
is a raised alert which turns out to be legitimate behavior, and a false negative is
illegal behavior which is not detected. The high rate of administration follows an
implementation of a IDS[15, 16, 17, 9], problems with a high rate of false positives
has also been mentioned by many [18, 13, 10, 19]. Implementing a behavior re-
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authentication model into the IDS, may ease the statistical uncertainly and reduce
the false positive alerts. One goal of such systems come from biometrics where
the hypothesis is; it is not what you do, rather how you do it, that defines who you
are.
Authentication has historically been conducted using biometrics by the human
eye, even if technology have not been available for long. Biometrics are com-
monly referred to as: physical traits and behavioral characteristics that makes
each of us unique. Biometrical technologies has seen an increasing popularity to
provide an extra security level to existing facilities.
The known existing verification models can be categorized as [4]:
(a) know: something a person knows (a password)
(b) have: something a person possesses (an id card)
(c) are: unique characteristics of a person (biometrics)
Because of cost, (a) and (b) have grown to be quite superior techniques of authen-
tication, but it has been facing some vast weaknesses. The measures falling under
the category (a) and (b) has weaknesses in the fact that possession or knowledge
may be compromised without discovery. Spoofing, session hijacking, password
cracking and theft of identification cards are all well known problems. Because
of the increasing trend, the old class (c) biometric has received more interest. But
there are some problems related to category (c) as well. The theft of a personal
characteristic like a finger or an eye, are the most extreme examples. And the
fact that most biometrics have some failure in enrollment, where samples are in-
valid. These systems are known as behavioral authentication systems, where the
ideas were first introduced by Denning in 1985[9]. Their promise is to solve the
authentication of users after a valid first authentication process has been success-
fully completed with access into a system.
Multilevel Security (or multi-level security - MLS), makes an effort to combine
multiple factors from categories (a), (b) and (c), to prevent users from obtaining
access to information or resources in which they lack authorization. Some systems
require high security clearances, or have need for a high degree security. Examples
are; online banking services and military systems. Most usually is combining
category (b) or (c), with category (a).
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2.3.1 Misuse Detection
Snort[20, 18, 13] is a pattern and signature tool with downloadable and re-sharable
rule sets for new attacks, popular as a misuse pattern matching tools in small
networks. It can perform tasks including content matching, protocol flag analysis
and can also be used to detect a variety of attacks and probes (For example buffer
overflow attacks, stealth and open port scans and OS fingerprinting attempts, to
name but a few.). As it can be setup to do runtime tests, it is frequently used
intrusion prevention purposes, by dropping previous illegal attacks on a system.
The snort community is providing newfound rule sets and patterns to stay ahead
of new attack types according to [14]. The misuse detection and pattern matching
approach to ID is unable to catch new attacks, and is in so failing to comply as
profile machine learning technique.
Distributed collectiveness of rule making has made this solution extremely pop-
ular, even though the process of mining is resource consuming. Especially the
dynamic firewall rule interaction implementation has made such systems very
usable[18].
2.3.2 Host Based Intrusion Detection Systems
The importance of detecting abnormal activity on single computers or servers
grows daily, as attackers get more cunning and professional. Studies have proved
that almost 80% of all companies experienced some sort of inside attack[17]. This
indicates a growing trend, which must be handled by the ID systems.
Current Host-based Intrusion Detection systems can be categorized under four
areas of workings [21]:
(a) filesystem monitoring
(b) logfile analysis
(c) connection analysis
(d) kernel-based intrusion detection
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Filesystem monitoring (a) basically deals with file and directory integrity checking
for illegal creation, deletion and/or alteration of the monitored objects, changed
permissions, owner and group. When detection abbreviates from the original
stored data, it raises alerts. Well known tools are Tripwire [22], AIDE [23] and
MTree. Some of the drawbacks however are lack of dynamics as tests are of-
ten ran at scheduled times, a high false positive rate without explicit and well
planned schemes (a new installation of an application can create a huge numbers
of alerts), attackers would also be able to cover their tracks before the comparison
takes place. Never the less, this kind of IDS is particularly good at picking up
most changes done on the filesystem and detecting unwanted activity.
Logfile analysis (b) is effectively used on more or less static logs, having a built-in
pattern matching criteria, which can generate real-time alerts when abnormalities
occur.
In connection analysis (c), applications such as PortSentry[24] listens for illegal
traffic coming to the host (such as attempts to connect to unwanted services),
illegal ports, portscan detection and port bindings. These tools usually have built
in firewall support, to dynamically block traffic, found to be illegal. There can be
a high administration cost to these systems to keep up to date, and also manage
rare, but not illegal, traffic which theoretically could be blocked.
The last approach (d) is kernel-based intrusion detection which includes aspects
such as users system usage, user system calls (order and argument based), kernel
model loading and unloading prevention (and more). The major drawback for
these kinds of systems is the high administration cost.
2.3.3 Data Mining
LaPadulla [25] found that scalability was one of the aspects of available tools that
had improved most with the Sensor/Agent/Director architecture (the sensor gath-
ers information, agent filters and reports to the director which make the decisions).
Having multiple sensors and local agents reporting to a central director service au-
diting data, seems to be the most common approach to large scale data collection.
LaPadulla concluded that even WAN scanners were now available to provide a
wide data collection platform. However he also points out that the lack of trace-
back functionality these tools provide, makes it almost impossible to identify the
origin of the attack. Bala et. al [26] has developed a state-of-the- art distributed
data collection with inter-agent communications, in so using TCPDump to col-
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lect large-scale datasets in which to build profiles and more or less dynamically
search for attacks. The false positive rate was however fairly high. LaPadullas
Anomaly Detection survey anno 1999 [25] concludes the trend of going primary
from network and system monitoring capabilities, into including more and more
AD functionality and modules.
Specification approach or pattern matching are specification-based similar to anomaly
detection in many ways, as they are based on detecting deviations of a norm. In-
stead of relying on a machine learning technique, they base on manually devel-
oped specifications that capture legitimate (rather than previously seen) system
behaviors. The downside is that the development of detailed specifications and
pattern creation can be time consuming, and the likelihood of a false negatives
can be high if the policy is not updated often enough.
2.3.4 Creating Profiles
In order for an anomaly detector to be able to differentiate the sampled data and the
’known’ behavior or profile, sufficient amount of data to do the statistical analysis
has to be collected. One often says that the statistical approach is characterized
by two phases: A training phase and a detection phase. In the training phase, the
behavior of the system is observed in the absence of attacks and machine learning
techniques are used to create a profile of such normal behavior. In the detection
phase, this profile is compared against the current behavior of the system, and any
deviations are flagged as potential attacks[14]. Unfortunately, systems often ex-
hibit legitimate but previously unseen behavior, which again leads AD techniques
to produce a high degree of false alarms, and hence reduce the effectiveness of
the systems [13, 14, 27, 28]. Much effort is made trying to reduce the high rate of
false alarms since HIDS is becoming more and more important.
2.3.5 Biometrics
A look at some types of behavioral authentication techniques reveal some different
attempts. Most modern biometric methods rely on characteristics of the body and
its behavior. Some examples of identifying biometric features used for identifica-
tion include hand geometry[29], thermal pattern in the face, blood vessel patterns
in the retina and hand, finger and voice prints[30], and handwritten signatures[31],
not to mention blood samples and DNA tests[29]. A common factor for most of
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System FER FQR FAR
Face Recognition 0.0 0.0 N/A
Fingerprint - Chip 1.0 2.8 9
Fingerprint - Optical 2.0 0.4 8
Hand 0.0 0.0 4
Iris scan 0.5 0.0 3
Vein 0.0 0.0 N/A
Voice recognition 0.0 2.5 9
Table 2.1: An overview of biometrics system-reliability in percent(%) on Failed
Enrollment Rate, Fail Aquire Rate and False Acceptance Rate.
these methods, is that they very rarely include behavioral characteristics. Most
often only physical traits.
Research on physical biometric authentication methods are many. Especially im-
portant are the success rates of different biometrics, for comparison with non-
physical biometric authentication methods. Fingerprint verification is of the cheap-
est to implement. Work with different algorithms have uncovered results from
1.73% to 47% equal error rate (EER) [32]. One point of interest in such research
is the fail enrollment rate(FER), which points to failed collection of data. This
can be due to constraints for the subject (user) in an enrollment phase (for ex-
ample missing eyes for iris scans), or hardware / software failiure. Maio et. al
concludes with rejected enrollment rates from 0% to 6.86%. Another measure
is the fail aquire rate (FQR), which quantify failiure to capture data of sufficient
quality (for example unrecognizeable fingerprints).
Research conducted by Mansfield et. al [33] give the table 2.1 for biometric sys-
tems 1.
There is no exact conclusion for this work [33], but the table still give an interest-
ing picture of the reliability and problems such measures encounters. The report
is critical to the amount of users they enrolled, and suggests a larger user group
for further work.
Attempts to profile user behavior has been mentioned as using file access, shell
commands, system calls or application access has been vast and difficult. Most
attempts use training and data gathering/sampling as a long learning process, and
1Mark that the FAR is read from a graph and may be somewhat inaccurate
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different algorithms to calculate intrusions. One of the later attempts was con-
ducted by Kang, Fuller and Honavar (2005)[34] and has provided the a bag of
system calls solution. They use the more commonly used bag of words repre-
sentation for text classification, assigning simple unordered system calls as data
input for a machine learning technique for profile creation. This light complexed
approach, proved extremely successful in their test (100% accuracy with 0% false
positives in parts of the testing), hence proving that one can achieve almost per-
fect detection rates even when disregarding the relation between system call and
originating process. In real life scenarios however, the accuracy rate achieved was
not as high as in the known datasets.
2.3.6 Mouse Movement Profiling
A fairly new field of research within behavioral biometrics is the mouse-movement
approach, where user mouse behaviors are sampled every x-thousand times a sec-
ond to create a representative dataset. Shivani et. al.[35] splits the active mouse
movement authentication into three steps:
• (a) enrollment
• (b) training
• (c) verification
For statistical calculations where the components average, mean, standard devia-
tion, minimum and maximum of the readings will be stored for all the vectors, (a)
is used.
The training phase (b) consists of a number of repetitions to acquire the variations
of the user, define the standard deviation for each user to determine the profile of
the user. In other words, repeating (a) for a number of times.
The verification (c) usually take place through a login screen or authentication
procedure, and mouse movements are recorded and statistically compared with
the users stored profile. If the results are computed within the accepted range of
the user, authentication is accepted.
A passive authentication has only two steps, (i) enrollment and (ii) verification.
Phase (i) is done over a longer time period. Shivani[35] use the term transition
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states about dense areas of the screen, meaning the areas where the mouse move-
ments are used the most, (for example near menus and scrollbars) have a higher
frequency of samples. This phase ends up with storing a profile computed on the
average, mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of users speed, angle
movement and distance from the center of the transition state. A verification test
is ran every two minutes to check if the variation of all the data samples lies within
a ± 1.5 standard deviation range.
Brodley and Pusara [17] have another angle toward the mouse movement authen-
tication and re-authentication. The experiment has mouse events grouped into
a hierarchical data set categories, from main node to three children: (1) Mouse
wheel points, (2) Non-client area movements (NC moves; typically menus and
toolbars) and (3) clicks, separating single and double clicks. The vectors saved
are distance, angle, time, speed, mean and standard deviation, but also a set of
categories which are defined to use a decision tree algorithm.
Basically, a tree of data consisting of means and deviations will be processed, giv-
ing a weighted decision tree classifier. Where Shivani et. al compare the samples
to the existing profile having 63 different users, the Pardue University group com-
pare each step/group/tree branch with all other users, giving a probability of iden-
tity. However the limitation of the latter experiment was a low number of users
(11) and only using one specific application (Internet Explorer). Shivanis[35]
experiments with all parameters in the active mode had some surprising results.
When accepting 3 times the standard deviation, the false rejection rate was 36 %,
but adjusting the level of accepted standard deviation value to 2, the false rejec-
tion rate went down to 15% on active authentication and a 90% discovery rate on
passive authentication.
Brodley and Pusara[17] concludes with a 0.43% false positive rate and 1.75%
false negative rate within the one application, after a tweaking process. There was
no tests conducted to cover any active authentication in these experiments.
Hashia, Stamp and Pollett published results in 2005[36] with an equal error rate
of 15%. Other results have been found in the works of Nisenson et. al [37], with
a 92% - 98% accuracy rate. Gamboa and Fred [38] made promise of a 3% - 4%
equal error rate in their research.
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2.3.7 Keystroke Dynamic Biometric Authentication
Another attempt that grew from the ideas mentioned is the keystroke dynamics
technique. Keystroke dynamics is the process of analyzing the way a user types
at a terminal, by monitoring the keyboard inputs thousands of times per second in
an attempt, to identify users based on habitual typing rhythm patterns[4]. In 1990
Joyce and Gupta [39] showed that keystroke rhythm is a good sign of identity
[40], and most research done on keystroke dynamics since, has been based upon
this work. Different approaches attempted has varied from extremely complex to
very simple. Time between start and end of a specific word, such as the, and
total time to write username, gave quite promising results, and made way for
content free authentication[41].
There are two main approaches. Static or active authentication seek to analyze
keystroke, verifying characteristics only at specific times (such as during login
sequence, forced retyping of password or input boxes etc), however this approach
does not provide continuous security, and cannot detect a substituted user after the
initial verification.
Passive or continuous monitoring will create a substantial performance overhead
compared to the active approach, but adds a level of security through being able
to detect user substitution and session highjacking.
Recent research [1] made available the following table 2.1 for keystroke dynamic
historical results and approaches.
Experiments done by Leggett and Williams[40] showed that continuous verifica-
tion of 17 programmers, using an identification system, gave a false alarm rate
(False Rejection) of about 5.5%, and a false negative (False Acceptance)rate of
approximately 5.0%. Gains et. al.[42] address several problems with regards to
keystroke timings, and opened up for considerable improvements.
Joyce and Gupta [39] claimed that the problem of recognizing a given pattern as
belonging to a particular person, either after exhaustive search through a large
database, or by simply comparing the pattern with a single authentication tem-
plate, could be formulated within a statistical decision theory. Their testing method-
ology based on a training set resulted in a classifier used for recognition, Eu-
clidean Distance Measures– "similarity" based on the distance between the pat-
tern vectors.
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Figure 2.1: Previous work and results on Keystroke Dynamics [1]
Further work suggested that median interkey latency of expert typists are approx-
imately 96 ms, while that of a novice is near 825 ms, therefrom making digraph-
specific measures would lead to measurable improvements in verification accu-
racy. Neural network approaches have also been undertaken, but widely found to
be expensive and time consuming, and retraining time would prove significant [4].
Joyce and Gupta [39] have found that the positive identification rate using weighted
probabilistic classifiers was approximately 87.18% on a dataset of 63 users, which
represents an improvement with respect to the Euclidean distance (83.22%) and
nonweighted scoring approach (85.63%). The Bayesian classifier gave a rate of
92.14%, which held an improvement rate of almost 5% over the weighted classi-
fiers.
There has been several interesting results from also more fine tuned testing within
keystroke dynamics. Monrose [4] has made available work for pure identification
of users based on keystroke timing. The work also includes an error correction
method for deviating data. Their conclude with a false acceptance rate (wrong
user identified) of 16 %.
An analysis of differences in languages has been conducted by Gunetti et. al[43],
bringing the conclusion that samples of free text for a combination of small seg-
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ments of samples is independent of language. Another research by Gunetti and
Picardi [41] considers free text and evaluates small parts of the text (for exam-
ple usage of character combinations like the, tic and ica), hidden inside long
passphrases. Their technique for 205 subjects obtained a FRR of less than 5% and
a FAR of less than 0.005%. This work has obtained the best result found when
researching for this survey, but requires a considerable length for a passphrase.
Nick Bartlow presented work in 2006 for improving existing results when con-
sidering usage of shift-button behavior (for example right-shift, left-shift or caps-
lock) [1]. He was able to boost accuracy of all the different schemes in the tests,
however the improvement rate varied greatly from algorithm to algorithm. This
work[1] also proved a significant performance difference for long passwords (12
characters), compared to short passwords (8 characters).
2.3.8 Keyboards
Keyboard History
The keyboard technology spun from the teletype machine combined with the
properties of the typewriter. The keyboard is normally used as an input device
when connected to a computer. The American typewriter Christopher Latham Sc-
holes patented in 1964, the typewriter that we commonly use today in 1868. MIT,
Bell Laboratories and General Electric created the first modern keyboard, using
video display terminals (VDT), which enabled users to see the actual text on a
display screen. This enabled users to create, edit and delete text.
A keyboard consists of a basic structure; The top layer has an arranged set of
buttons or keys. These have the ability to send electronic impulses through an in-
terface to the computer when pressed down. Latham Scholes developed the most
widespread standard arranging of keys, know as QWERTY. There are other key ar-
ranging standards(for example AZERTY and DVORAK). Language adjustments
make keyboard design differ for different countries.
Keyboards typically have characters engraved or printed on the keys, which ordi-
narily corresponds to a symbol. However, some symbols requires pressing several
keys sequentially. Other keys does not produce symbols but operates the com-
puter or input itself. A keyboard also contain a microprocessor and a BIOS (Basic
Input/Output System) to sense the keys pressed and transmit the corresponding
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key code to the computer.
Keyboard Communication
When pressing down a key, a conductive contact on the underside touches a pair of
conductive lines on the circuit below. This enables a flow of signals. The keyboard
control device scans the lines to all keys, and generate a key code (also known
as scan code) as the signal pair changes. The code is sent to the computer (for
example through a cable or wireless connection). The computer receives the signal
bits and decodes it into the appropriate keypress and computes the appropriate
action (for example type text to the display device, lit leds or start computations).
The scan codes picked up by the keyboard bios is sent down the serial line in
hex format (for example the ’A’ key has the scancode of 1C) [44]. If the key is
not released within a set time, the keyboard will continue to send the code until
another code is picked, up or the key is released. When a key is released, the
scan signal ’F0’ will be sent followed by the corresponding key scan code for the
computer to know which key is released. Each key has exactly one scan code.
Different engravings on a single key exists quite commonly, and thus there are
control keys (for example shift-key and Caps-Lock key) which are interpreted by
the computer to determine the correct keypress.
The keyboard protocol is bi-directional, making it possible to both send and re-
ceive data.
2.4 Summary
Using behavioral authentication and re-authentication to detect users pattern anoma-
lies, has been implemented with variable success on different interaction levels
(system calls, keystroke dynamics and mouse movement). These are all user be-
havior based, using non physical biometrics, but has shown themselves valuable
for further research even after simple testing. All the tests conducted and men-
tioned in this section of the paper has by the authors been concluded inadequate
without any other authentication method.
Problems such as users drinking coffee while typing, being on the phone or simply
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switching users or administrators to help conduct work related tasks, are all likely
scenarios which can fall through in these applications.
The main problems with keystroke recognition are ranging from:
• The pattern database search time.
• The keystroke improvement of users (profile learning and growth).
• Distractions making users change their writing characteristics. Some of the
same problems occur also with mouse detection.
However, in environments and applications where mouse usage is scarce (e.g.
some linux environments) mouse-detection tests would prove to have very little
data. Also considering different mouse types (e.g. 8 button mice with 2 scroll-
weels vs a standard one button Mac mouse), one would need different data en-
rollment applications. Finally, input profiling systems are complex and add more
levels of administration to implementation and maintenance. There are generally
fewer standards and less implementation problems using keystroke dynamics.
When it is uncertain whether behavior is anomalous or not, the system may rely on
a parameter that is set during initialization to reflect behavior, or gain support from
parameters outside the actual event in question. One example of such a system
could be a re-authentication system. Adding these ideas to a situation where a
statistical uncertainty has occurred and found by a IDS, could greatly increase the
decision accuracy, and reducing the numbers of false negatives. Combine a false
positive rate of 10% by initial IDS, and 5% by the re-authentication system, the
combined false positive rate would come to 0.5%.
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Observations
This chapter include important observations found in the tests conducted, which
should be considered before looking at the models and results.
3.1 Terminal Types
One important aspect to consider when analyzing the user profiles, is differences
for a user when changing terminal. The terminal is the object or keyboard used to
enter the data into the system. This could be a palm pilot, a cell phone or different
keyboard types. In this work only different keyboards and computers were used to
test. One USB keyboard on computer 1 (type 1), one PS2 keyboard on computer
1 (type 3) and a laptop with an internal laptop keyboard on computer 2 (type 2)
were used in the experiments.
Figure 3.1 gives an overview of differences for user 15 on the computer 2 (laptop)
and computer 1 with a USB keyboard. The reason for selecting this specific user
is because it is the one user with the least difference between the profiles. As can
be seen from the figure the terminal type 1 has lower standard deviations, and on
average less KeyDown time than type 2. However the values are quite similar,
especially in the last 4 keystrokes. Around 9% of the entries would not accepted
as legitimate logins. This test was conducted using full profiles, and it is expected
that the FAR could increase somewhat, from the experiences of the other tests.
Another fact to consider would be the use of Alert Levels, which improved the
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Value test rate from 10-30%. This has not been applied in these tests.
Figure 3.1: Full profile comparison for different terminals on KeyDown parame-
ter.
When examining the figure 3.2 for the KeyWait parameter, the results are quite
different. Again the average waiting time is lower for terminal type 1 compared
to terminal type 2. The terminal type two have larger deviations, which indicate
less consistency. As a matter of fact only 30% of the last 4 keys for type 2 would
be within standard deviation limits for input type 1.
Thus 70% of the total attemts to log in with another terminal would fail. There are
users where as much as 95% of the logins for all keystrokes would fail. There is a
huge difference in how a user types on a laptop as opposed to a regular keyboard.
When imagining typing on an unknown laptop (or any other not known keyboard
type), it seems likely that users slow down to enter the correct characters. There
is a difference of the space between characters on a laptop keyboard and a regular
keyboard, which could also cause this behavior.
When comparing the USB keyboard of the same type as a PS2 keyboard (identical
in design), there is no recognizable difference in the profiles. There are some
small differences, but the profiles match at a rate of 92% for KeyWait and 95%
for KeyDown, with standard deviation, on average.
The main parameter that fail in these tests, is the KeyWait. Looking at the Key-
Down time from a button is pressed down until released, no difference from a
regular keyboard to a laptop keyboard could be found. It is important to point out
that only users from proficiency level 3 and 4 (considered experienced users) was
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Figure 3.2: Profile comparison for different terminals on KeyWait parameter, pre-
sented by samples from user 15.
used in these tests. There could be differences between these users and users on
the lower proficiency levels. It was evaluated, and found that the most consistent
users only should preform these tests, because they were most likely to have expe-
rience with keyboards and have less unknown behavior alteration (less uncertainty
factors).
For every input type where there are significant design changes as to form, size or
spacing, a legitimate login would probably be considered as an intrusion. There
was no time to examine this in further detail with respect to more input terminals,
or more detailed proof. When implementing a system this fact has to be taken
into consideration. Changing the keyboard could imply a new profile needs to be
created. There could be shown no evidence to support that the same would go for
different technologies like USB versus PS2.
3.2 The KeyWait parameter
The time between two characters is described in the KeyWait parameter. Histori-
cally this parameter have been used in different ways, but the most common usage
can be seen in figure 3.3. This approach has some disadvantages, which is why
another approach was attempted. Section 4.2 discusses and describes how the
KeyDown and KeyWait parameters are used in this work.
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Figure 3.3: The most common usage of the KeyDown and KeyWait parameters.
Notice that the KeyWait parameter is used differently in this work.
The KeyDown characteristics does not have this flexibility, and is used in the same
way other research have been using it.
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Method
This chapter covers the basic concepts of how the test environment was imple-
mented. Using data from multiple logins and multiple users is essential to get
variability in the data, reflecting the patterns of each user, and in turn recognizing
and differentiating them. This chapter will also cover the data mining and gather-
ing process through profile creation. An overview of the process is illustrated in
Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Process overview chart. From terminal input through logging and
database filtering, to profiles and results. (clip-art: www. yankeedownload.com)
This work has collected input data from multiple sources, including a laptop key-
41
CHAPTER 4. METHOD
board, regular USB keyboard and a PS2 keyboard. The result is saved in a log
file, which is filtered in an import function and stored in a database structure. The
database is used to derive and store user profiles as well as test results. Some re-
sults have been calculated directly through using math tools such as Mathematica
and also using a spreadsheet application.
4.1 Environment
The major operating systems (OS) and applications existing today have a login
sequence. This includes OS logins and application logins (both web based and
terminal based). Implementation of a proof of concept login sequence was done
in a separate application. There are no reasonable grounds for implementing such
a feature directly into a specific OS login, as opposed to an application on top of
the operating system, for these experiments.
Availability is arguably the most common reason for choosing a web application
login sequence. It enables users to login at any appropriate time or place. However
there are downsides to such an approach. Control of activity is limited, which
results in increased management and a high amount of communication to ensure
proper data collection. Also there could be uncertainty in the data. Users may have
different environments such as keyboards, systems, OS and browsers, to name a
few. This may result in invalid or false data.
Based on the assumption that a controlled environment, all users have the same pa-
rameters, a stand-alone application was created for all experiments. Users varying
in age and technical level was the main reason for choosing a Microsoft Windows
like login. This would enable some familiarity to previously used systems and
reduces the insecurity for not proficient computer users. Proficient users would
have smaller problems in adapting to this kind of technology, look and feel.
4.2 Parameters and Properties
When entering a character on a keyboard, a set of instructions is sent from the
keyboard to the computer. In this thesis the parameters KeyDown (also referred to
as kd) and KeyWait (also referred to as kw) are the ones used most frequently. The
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figure 4.2 illustrates the time period these parameters actually span over. The Key-
Down is defined as the time from a key is pressed down, until the key is depressed
(released). Every key can have different KeyDown time for each user, depending
on their general behavior. Different keys and key combinations are likely to have
a different KeyDown time. This may be because of the angle the fingers have
on each key, the familiarity with the text one is typing and the familiarity with
a certain key combination. For example entering your name or password, which
has been entered frequently and has become a habit (there is no thinking when
typing). There is not much flexibility in how this parameter is used, and previous
research using time in keystroke, use this exact definition.
Figure 4.2: Graphical representation of the KeyDown and KeyWait parameters.
The KeyWait parameter has been used in different manners. Most commonly
is the time from one key is released to the next key is pressed. Also research
has attempted to use the time from the first key is depressed to the next key is
depressed. No research found has used the KeyWait parameter as shown in the
figure 4.2. The gray area represent the third key which span over the next key.
This indicates a shift-key.
In this thesis the KeyWait time is calculated from one key is pressed, to the next is
pressed. The figure shows the KeyWait as the time period from char 2 (the same
as key 2) is pressed down, until the char 3 is pressed down. There are several
reasons to why this approach was selected. One being the fact that no negative
numbers can be encountered. The second key would always be pressed down
before the third key, or else the password would not match. When considering
shift-keys, the key is not actually depressed before the consecutive key is pressed
and depressed. To validate and get the correct timestamps, ordering of keys would
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be needed.
This approach disregards the underlying reason behind the parameter value. It
does not matter if it is the time between the characters, or the time a key is de-
pressed, which contribute to the value. But it does depend on the parameter being
consistent for each user. The depressed deviation is handled by KeyDown. Ideally
the KeyDown is consistent, and the actual waiting time would be accurate.
4.3 The Application
Designing the layout and content of the login was done and tested carefully, mak-
ing it very much standard without any confusing texts or extra features. The figure
4.3 shows a screenshot of the login window. It consists of one input field with the
label UserName, one input field with the label password and a button (with the
label Login). One hidden field (shown in italic) was set before each session to
contain the username of the tester and the type of terminal used in the session.
Users were unaware of this field, and it was used to check the UserName field.
One element in the login is a counter showing the progress in number of attempts.
Figure 4.3: The login window used in the login sessions.
Note that the fields UserName and Password are blank upon opening the login
window, and the counter is reset. The password (p4Ssw0rd) is just an example
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which resembles the actual password selected. It is not the password used in these
experiments. The Real Ident field is hidden for the users, and will contain the real
username of the user conducting a login, not the one a user selects. It is used for
error checking.
4.4 Technology
Advantages with using existing resources, such as libraries and built in features,
made C# the selected option for developing the login application. One advan-
tage of using this programming language is the ability to use the .NET frame-
work for designing windows and visual elements. The .NET C# environment use
the System.Windows.Forms library with Control.KeyPress Events,
Control.KeyDown Events and Control.KeyUp Events classes. These
control classes are used to handle the input and output stream of data on the key-
board port. Typically the input stream is used in these experiments as no com-
mands are sent back to the keyboard.
The application can run on any .NET 2.0 supporting OS, including Microsoft
Windows 98 and newer. It is compiled into an executable .exe file and logs to a
CSV (comma separated) text file.
4.4.1 Timestamp
Each time a key is pressed down or released, an event is triggered. This event
(type according to key press or key release), will have a timestamp which consists
of the number of microseconds (µ) since 01.01.1900. The timestamp value is used
for calculating the time from a key to be pressed down to it is released, and for
calculating the time between the keys.
4.4.2 Log Data
For each keypress entered into the password field the following attributes are
logged:
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1. KeyDown time stamp
2. KeyCode value (the character code)
3. KeyUp time stamp
4. KeyWait time value
The KeyCode contains the character value associated with the button depressed.
For example the character a will have KeyCode A. Notice that the character A will
also have the KeyCode A. So extracting the actual character is dependent on a
signal or beacon from the keyboard, telling the computer that the next character is
uppercase or lowercase. This is normally done using the Shift-keys. The KeyCode
for the number 6 would be D6, short for digit 6. Using the number-keys on the top
row of QWERTY keyboards, will give a different KeyCode than using the right-
hand side num-pad. None of the users used the num-pad in the login sessions.
The logfile has the following format2:
Logfile 1. testnumber, username, character, timestamp (kd), timestamp (kw), time-
wait (kw)
4.4.3 Extracting Parameters
For future use, an import procedure was created. It read the logfile and stored
the samples into a database. Due to mistypes and errors in logins, only valid
logins with the correct password and correct KeyCode order are accepted as sam-
ples. Entering the correct password is not enough in itself.For example using the
backspace key to correct a spelling mistake, is not a valid sample.
There are numerous ways to change the password character ordering in order to
pass a simple password comparison on pressing the submit button. However this
kind of behavior would severely demolish the data in the tests, as it is depending
on a correct character ordering when conducting the Identification test.
2Timewait is calculated from the KeyDown timestamp of the current character minus the Key-
Down timestamp of the previous character. For the first character in the password, the value is
always 0.
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Another reason for choosing a database structure would also include easy access
to the data, as well as great features to visualize the results, using simple SQL
queries. SQL support all the mathematical functions needed to build user profiles
on the queried data. A web application was created for displaying the results and
preliminary results in a easy fashion. More details can be found in the Appendix
section C.5.
4.4.4 The Database
The database structure consists of the following tables:
Table 1. tblUser: fldID, fldUsername, fldPassword, fldAge, fldLevel
Table 2. tblTest: fldID, fldUser, fldType, fldStartTime, fldKeyBoard
Table 3. tblSample: fldID, fldLoginMother, fldCharNr, fldKeyDown, fldKeyWait
Table 4. tblProfile: fldID, fldUser, fldtype,fldKeyBoard,
fldKDChar1...n, fldKWChar1...n, fldSKDChar1...n, fldSKWChar1...n
Table 5. tblTestresult: fldTestResultID, fldTestResult_testid,
fldTestResult_type, fldTestResult_profiletype, fldTestResult_value1,
fldTestResult_value2, fldTestResult_value3, fldTestResult_value4
A database diagram can be found in the Appendix section C.3.
tblUser is used to store user information. Separating users on age (fldAge) and
computer proficiency (fldLevel) is useful in later tests and conclusions. The profi-
ciency level is set in 4 levels (1 through 4) where 1 is lowest and 4 is the highest
level of proficiency. The appropriate level selected is based on the expected ex-
perience level, computer workings and the general computer knowledge through
experiences and communication with the users. The levels are based on the fol-
lowing level description for computer proficiency.
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1. Novice User
2. Beginner (with some experience)
3. Advanced User
4. Experienced Expert
For each unique login, a record is inserted into the tblTest. The fldType is a classi-
fier of the password type. fldKeyBoard is used to separate one input terminal and
/ or keyboard type in order to distinguish pattern differences.
tblSample consists of one entry for each character in any approved login attempt.
The fldLoginMother relates the character to a specific login attempt. fldCharNr
is used for mathematical purposes to relate samples to each other and ordering of
the samples. fldKeyDown is set to be the KeyUp.timestamp - KeyDown.timestamp
(the total time the key is pressed down). fldKeyWait is the waiting time from the
previous entry KeyDown to this entry KeyDown. See figure 4.2 for a graphical
representation of these parameters.
The table tblProfile has user id to correspond to a specific user (fldUser), a field
for each kind of user profile type (fldtype) and fldKeyBoard for separating terminal
/ keyboard types. The average KeyDown time (kd) and average KeyWait (kw)
time is calculated for each character, and the corresponding standard deviation
uncertainty of each character on the KeyDown (skd) and KeyWait (skw) is also
calculated. As our password will always have the same length (9 characters), this
kind of approach can be used. In an environment where the number of characters
differs from user to user; a new structure would be needed, where a counter keeps
track of the number of characters and the ordering of the keystrokes in the profile.
The table tblTestResult contains the result of every test run in order to make
comparisons between different tests. FldTestResult_testid contains the test id
from tblTest, while fldTestResult_type stores the type of test. Fields fldTestRe-
sult_value1 through fldTestResult_value4 stores the result of the tests.
4.4.5 Data Collection Results
When making the final analysis there were 25 different users involved. 12 of these
conducted tests on multiple terminal types. When verifying the password, 27% of
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User distribution
Gender
Male 15
Female 10
Age
60+ 2
50+ 5
40+ 4
30+ 8
20+ 6
Origin
America 1
Africa 2
Asia 2
Europe 20
Proficiency
1 5
2 6
3 9
4 5
Table 4.1: Subject/user distribution for Gender, Proficiency, Origin and Age
the login attempts failed (passwords were entered incorrectly). This was higher
than expected, and unfortunately reduced the number of login samples. One type
of password were tested, on three different terminals (keyboards and computers).
The total amount of valid logins were 3906.
In order to get a wide range of users, differentiating in gender, age and computer
proficiency, users from different environments and professions were chosen (see
table 4.1). 10 of the users were female and 15 were male. 2 subjects were over 60
years old. 6 users between 50 and 59, 3 subjects between 40 and 49. The largest
group was users between 30 and 39, namely 8, while 6 people were younger than
30 years old. Individuals from Europe, Asia, Africa and America contributed to
the tests, although 20 originated from Europe (Norway).
The users were separated into estimated computer proficiency levels 1 through 4,
where 4 is the most proficient. At level 1, 5 users were estimated. 6 users were
registered as second level proficient. 9 users was found most fit for the third level,
and 5 people at the highest level. The proficiency levels are discussed in section
4.4.4.
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4.4.6 Choosing Password
An assumption for this work is that the accuracy in how a user types the pass-
word will increase as the familiarity of the password is increasing. Studies by
Yan et. al [7] shows the memorability of passwords has great influence on the
chance of misuse. Verheul conducted research in the security aspect of selecting
the password[5]. The conclusion told of a significant improvement in security
breaches when selecting a complex password compared to a not complex pass-
word. In this study the users have been given the same password without knowing
this. This increases the number of samples to use as the login attempts can be
considered both as intrusions and valid logins depending on the profile owner.
It is important to use a password consisting of several different elements. It should
consist of both lowercase and uppercase letters. This forces the use of key com-
binations. Uppercase letters are a combination of several keypress, a shift button
(left shift, right shift or caps-lock) needs to be used before the consecutive key,
and is released after the key is released 3. It therefore increase the total password
length with one character pr. uppercase letter (unless there are multiple consecu-
tive capital letters, which would result in a total increase of one, not more, char-
acters). For example the password: ’iA’, is a combination of 3 characters, namely
’i’, ’Shift’ and ’a’. Recent research [1] on user behavior shows an increased accu-
racy when separating different shift options to create uppercase letters. This has
not been implemented in these experiments, and would increase the accuracy of
the results even more.
Dictionary attacks are potential problems when selecting a password, thus the
selected password should not be found in any dictionary of any language and also
needs to consist of a combination of characters and numerical values. Research
also concludes that longer passwords have better accuracy than short passwords
[1, 7].
3Caps-lock works a little different from the Right and Left Shift buttons, as you actually release
the button before entering the next character. After the next character button is released, the Caps-
Lock button is again pressed and depressed. Such a behavior would not get approved as a login in
the test environment. There is however no reason, other than time constraints, behind the decision
of not implementing this and similar features into the scripts used in this thesis.
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This in mind, the selected password has the following format: LDULLLDL
L: lowercase character
D: digit character
U: uppercase character
The length of the password string is 8 characters, but considering uppercase let-
ters, the total length is 9 KeyCodes. This is often overlooked in many systems,
requiring a set number of characters. Using uppercase letters increase the total
length may reduce the difficulty of a password, and with increasing the length
also increasing the detection accuracy. Users in these experiments subsequently
complained about the complexity of the password, which proves that the approach
did indeed work.
4.5 Profiling
A profile is in this thesis the calculated average of a set of logins from one user.
The users underwent several independent login sessions, where 15 logins were
attempted in a session (minimum 5 sessions), until 60 successful logins where
completed. This provides sufficient amount of data to undergo statistical and
mathematical analysis, and a solid data foundation on which to base a profile.
The aspect of selecting a complex password proved, as intended, the result of an
incrementally growing learning phase as the password became increasingly famil-
iar.
The term profile growth is used to describe the way login samples change over
time. When the password is entered repeatedly, a noticable trend emerges, due
to increased consistency. Profile growth is used to describe both the change in
pattern for single users, as well as the general trend for all users. The impact
profile growth has to the test results, is described in detail in section 5.3.
Three different profiles were created for every user.
Profile 1. First 50% of successful logins attempts
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Profile 2. Last 50% of successful logins attempts
Profile 3. All successful logins
This setup enables analyzing the learning phase and how the profiles grow for a
specific user or set of users. The assumption would be that users have less uncer-
tainty in the second profile, compared to the other two. It also should indicate the
proficiency of the users, where users with only basic computer proficiency would
grow slower and have higher uncertainty than more proficient users. This would
be important in an environment where accuracy in identification is relatively high.
An assumption would be to expect users with low uncertainty (standard deviation)
profiles to have a lower False Acceptance Rate (FAR). However there is a possi-
bility of an increased False Rejection Rate (FRR) for anomalous login attempts.
It could be easier to identify these users in statistical and mathematical compar-
isons. The Equal Error Rate (EER) is the value where FRR and FAR is exactly
the same (if represented as two graphs, this would be where the graphs cross).
A Mean Error Rate (MER; mean difference between FRR and FAR) can also be
used as a better measure of how the results from FRR and FAR compare. One
advantage using MER as opposed to EER is the fact that MER will always have a
value between 1% and 100%, EER cannot guarrantee a result.
4.5.1 Profile Parameters
Each login sample consist of a set (X) of characters of n length. Ranging from
x1, x2, . . . , xn. With the two selected parameters KeyDown (kd) and KeyWait
(kw), each having a corresponding standard deviation value, results are shown in
the profile matrix 4.2. The annotation skw and skd will be used throughout the
paper, meaning the deviation property of kd and kw. However σkdi will be the
mathematical expression for the deviation of the parameter xkdi of kd.
4.6 The Alphabet
In this work the alphabet describes a range of possible values in the data gath-
ered. For keystrokes, time is the dimension we collect data on. A computer has a
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User profile
kd xkd1 xkd2 ... xkdn
kw xkw1 xkw2 ... xkwn
skd σkd1 σkd2 ... σkdn
skw σkw1 σkw2 ... σkwn
Table 4.2: The default user profile template with KeyDown, KeyWait, KeyDown
deviation (skd) and KeyWait deviation (skw) characteristics.
running process that queries the keyboard port every 1 microsecond (µ). The least
amount of time a key can be depressed is 0 (zero) µs, although highly unlikely to
occur in a real sample. It will occur in the first KeyWait property, before the first
character has been pressed down. When a key has been pressed down for 1500
µs, the computer considers the value to be a new character4.
This should enable an alphabet of 1500 possibilities. When studying the data
samples, there were some values that was repeated too often to be regarded as
random hits. Ordering the samples independently and with distinct values (one of
each value only), gave a list of numbers with a repeating pattern. There seem to
be a 15.5 µs period between all the gathered values. This proved to be the case for
different keyboard types (two different USB keyboards and one PS2 keyboard was
tested) and different computers. The search for an explanation to this phenomenon
was unfortunately not successful. Two hypothesis are suggested, the first being
the frequency of which a standard keyboard is sending signals, is every 15.5 µs.
Another suggestion could be an unknown computer software process or hardware
setting delaying the measurements.
Regardless of the explanation, the data is consistent on this delay, and would affect
all users in the same manner. The data is therefore considered valid. This does
however reduce the alphabet of values for KeyDown and KeyWait from 1500
to 100. A reduction like this would limit any distinction between users, as the
granularity of the experiments deteriorate. Still, 15 µs is probably sufficient to
separate users on typing behavior.
4This max time of 1500 µ will actually be reduced to 1000, 700 and 500 µs in turn, as a feature
in order to type repetitive characters faster without releasing (depressing) the button.
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4.7 Selecting Parameters from Characteristics
When typing on a keyboard, several characteristics is needed to make a final de-
cision. Attempts of one of these characteristics have been made in related work,
however combined results from different types of tests has not been found in any
known material. Using a combined result metric for decision making would en-
able several of the test types to successfully differentiate the user in question.
Some of the tests could find itself in a gray area, where other tests would possibly
make a successful comparison. There is also a chance of the different analyz-
ing tools to get contradicting result. Where none of the tests can make a positive
match, no answer can be found.
The following tests are used to evaluate the data in this thesis:
Value test 1. The Value test is taking the solid values of a sample and comparing
them to each keystroke in the profile of the username selected
Identification test 1. Using LN methods the Identification test is used to deter-
mine the total angle in a multi dimensional grid
Pattern test 1. Ignoring the values, but looking only at the pattern of values going
up or down from the previous character
4.8 Models and Evaluation Methods
Having defined the profiles of each individual user on different levels, the next
step would be to analyze and compare users. In order to select the appropriate
approach, knowledge of the data distribution is needed. Distribution models have
different advantages and tool for analysis. Several models were tested before an
acceptable one could be found. This section describes the steps taken, and why
models were accepted or discarded.
This section will also go into detail of the process of verification and identification
of a user trying to login. The figure 4.4 shows the process from entering the
password on a terminal, through a keystroke evaluator (Value test). Not depending
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Figure 4.4: A detailed process overview of the entire login sequence, with
keystroke evaluation (Value Test) and identification (Identification test). (clip-art:
www.yankeedownload.com)
on the success of the evaluation (whether it is verified or rejected), an attempt to
identify the user will be conducted. When disregarding the success of the Value
test, it may be possible to identify both hacking attempts which fail, and also
identify the user that succeed in hacking into another user account. The figure 4.4
describe how this is implemented.
4.8.1 Value Test
The Value test is conducted to match each single KeyCode, KeyDown and Key-
Wait time in the login, with the accepted limit values of the key, to the profile of
the user trying to access the system. There will be a total of 18 tests, where only
17 are significant as the KeyWait time for character 1 is always 0. This sample
would always have an exact match.
The result of such a test would be to see how many of the keys would fall within
the allowed range of values, based on the previous behavior (previous sampled
values) of the user. This gives the opportunity to decide whether the user should
be allowed into the system or not. Experiment tests are based on the mean value
for each key, and a calculated standard deviation which gives information of how
much the users input vary.
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Alert Levels
A phase in the Value test is calculating the number of keystrokes that fall outside
of the allowed limits. The higher the number of keys outside the allowed range of
values, the less likely it is that this is the correct user. When there are no values
outside of the ranges, the login belongs to the Alert Level 0. If there is one value
outside of the given range, the login would belong to Alert Level 1, and so on.
The implementation of the Alert Levels is not discussed in this part of the work. It
can be looked upon as a strictness level, or the level in which the threat should be
regarded. Details on Alert Levels can be found in section 5.2.1.
4.8.2 Identification test
There are several motivations to why identification is desirable. When examining
a compromised system it is desirable to establish:
1. What has happened ?
2. Who was responsible ?
3. How can it be avoided ?
Identification of the user logged in is usually done by username and login. Pass-
word theft disrupts this approach. Especially if a internal intruder have gained
privileges through another account. It would be almost impossible to track with-
out direct interrogation. When adding an identification phase to every login, a set
of the users most probable to have conducted the login, it would be very useful in
this process to locate the actual user behind the false accepted login.
When a password is falsely entered a number of times because of failing a keystroke
evaluation process, a identification for each attempt can give insight in which users
are trying to obtain privileges through another account. In this manner it can be
viewed as a intrusion detection tool, and not only an extra security layer.
The purpose of the Identification test is to identify a user attempting to log in. Fo-
cus on internal attacks has received more attention as of late. There is no research
found on the actual identification of users trying to login to a system. The Value
56
4.8. MODELS AND EVALUATION METHODS
test (4.8.1) approach to reject logins with behavior outside of the set limits of an
ordinary login for one user. When facing an inside threat, normally a intruder
would also have a profile on the system based on his/her previous behavior.
Adding an Identification test to a login procedure for both accepted and rejected
logins could be useful in tracking the actual user. To accomplish this some as-
sumptions has to be made. The first assumption is that in order to identify a user,
the user must have a profile on the system. The test will always find the most
likely candidate, but if the intruder does not have a profile, the person with the
most similar behavior will be selected. This does not prove that this is the user
trying to log in, it merely gives an indication.
The Value test use all the parameters needed to differentiate the user from the
profile. When trying to connect a user to a profile, another approach is suggested.
An established profile in this work will have a certain amount of deviation to each
keystroke. The Identification test makes an attempt to disregard the values in
itself, and investigates the difference between the sample login and every profile
to find the best match.
To obtain the best possible match, a multi-dimensional vector is used. Each
keystroke will be defined as a point in a graph, and the angle difference between
the keystroke and the profile will used for comparison.
Calculation of Angle (θ)
Imagine the login sample value as x, and the profile value y. The angle between
first keystroke in the login sample (x1) and the first keystroke in the profile (y1)
describes the variance. This can be repeated for all keystrokes until reaching xn
and yn. Combining the variance for every keystroke gives a total variance, which
describes the difference between a sample and a profile. The angle (θ) between
two points through origo is calculated as follows:
X · Y = |X| · |Y | · cos θ (4.1)
cos θ =
X · Y
|X| · |Y | (4.2)
θ = arccos (
X · Y
|X| · |Y |) (4.3)
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The crossproduct is defined as:
X · Y =
n∑
i=1
xiyi (4.4)
The scalarproduct is defined as:
|y| =
√
y2i + y
2
i + . . .+ yn
2 (4.5)
Entering this into a geometric hyperplane with n dimensions, using the knowledge
obtained from (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4) as numerator and (3.5) as the denomi-
nator gives the following formula (3.6) for calculating the total angle difference:
θ = arccos
x1 · y1 + x2 · y2 + . . .+ xn · yn√
x21 + x
2
2 + . . .+ x
2
n ·
√
y21 + y
2
2 + . . .+ x
2
n
(4.6)
The comparison will result in a number between 0 and 1, with 0 being a perfect
match.
Identifying User
Comparing one sample to all the profiles, will give a numerical value for each
profile. Ordering the list of profiles on this value in ascending order enables the
test to find the most similar profile. It is important to remember that this test
type may not be directly possible to implement into a system. It is improbable
that an intruder has a profile based on the same set of characters. However in
this proof of concept, imagine the test to test a typing pattern of random words.
Even though this is testing one password, one can see the idea of testing parts of
a password that is similar for all users. Another angle of usage is through passive
behavior sniffing. Looking at words typed outside of a login sequence, like e-mail
writing, commands given in a shell, or other suitable situations where input from
the keyboard is given.
It can also easily be introduced if the Value test only barely accepts the entry, and a
pass phrase is presented to a user in addition to a password to identify the user and
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get a second opinion or approach to the verification. Implementation suggestions
will be covered in greater detail in the conclusion and discussion chapter.
4.8.3 Result Rating Terminology
These are the definitions of the terms used for explaining and comparing results
in the tests and comparing the result with related work.
Terminology 1. FAR - False Acceptance Rate: Rate the number of impostors
falsely accepted to the system. For example, an FAR of 3% indicates that 3 out of
every 100 imposters are falsely accepted as valid users
Terminology 2. FRR - False Reject Error Rate: Quantifies the number of le-
gitimate users which are falsely rejected and denied access to the system. For
example, FRR of 3% indicates that 3 out of every 100 legitimate users are rejected
as invalid users.
Terminology 3. EER - Equal Error Rate: Rate at which FAR equals FRR. In the
above examples the CER is 3%. Other terms are CER - Cross-over Error Rate
Terminology 4. MER - Mean Error Rate: Rate of the mean between FAR and
FRR. In the above examples the MER is 3%. Other terms are AER - Average
Error Rate
Terminology 5. FQR - Fail acQuire Rate: Rate of distribution of invalid users
for a specific feature. For example a user with a invalid biometric feature when
being blind, and in such failing the iris scan. Other terms are FAR - Fail Acquire
Rate
Terminology 6. FER - Fail Enrollment Rate: Rate of which the user samples
are invalid. Examples of this is extremely high deviations (for example user with
parkinson for keystroke dynamics), and fingerprints where pattern is unavailable
due to for example fireburn or missing fingers.
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Results
This chapter cover the results found, step by step for each test. It describe samples,
comparison of users and creation of profiles based on the observations. It goes
into debt on profile growth and error distribution, and give insight on how the
Alert Levels is used to improve results.
5.1 Data Values and Profiles
One factor for making any assumptions and studying the test result, is knowledge
about the data and values at hand. This knowledge would be put into use before
creating profiles and determining what should be considered as normal behavior.
This section goes into detail on these matters.
5.1.1 Samples
A random sample from a successful login can be found in table 5.1. This particular
user sample has several values worth noticing. The KeyDown values range, from
93 µs to 343 µs. The KeyWait from 203 µs (not considering the kw1 with 0
µs wait time before beginning to type), to 531 µs. This sample provide the basic
knowledge to how widely spread the data samples are, and what can be considered
as low or high values in the following sections.
61
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
User 10
kd 109 93 343 156 140 125 140 125 93
kw 0 281 328 203 375 250 250 531 343
Table 5.1: One login sample table for user 10, with KeyDown (kd) and KeyWait
(kw) values.
Another thing to recognize in these data, is the repetitive behavior of some sample
values. The values 93, 140 and 250 can be found several times within this one
login sample. With the sample granularity of microseconds, it would be highly
unlikely to hit the exact microsecond for multiple values in one sample. This
behavior is discussed in greater details in section 4.6.
Figure 5.1: A graphical representation of one login sample for user 10, with Key-
Down and KeyWait values.
A representation of these sample data is shown in graph 5.1. A pattern can be
found in this data sample, and is quite common for most users, namely the fact that
the KeyDown values are generally lower than the KeyWait for that same character.
This is reasonable if imagining how long one actually holds a key down compared
to waiting time between keystrokes. However the third character KeyDown value
(right or left Shift button), is considerably higher, as the Shift button needs to be
depressed all while the next character is entered, this behavior is expected.
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Figure 5.2: Five login samples and profile of user 10, showing the KeyDown
trend.
Looking at the trend, a user in figure 5.2 show 5 login KeyDown samples (sample
number 1, 11, 21, 31 and 41) and the KeyDown profile. The sample graph show
some inconsistency for this user, but a general trend can be found. There are some
anomalies character 3 in sample 1, character 5 from sample 21 and 1, character 9
of sample 31. Sample 41 seems to be slightly lower on average than the rest of the
samples, and more importantly lower than the profile. Sample 1 has the opposite
quality, usually higher values than the other samples, and higher than the profile.
This will be discussed in considerable detail in section 5.3 on profile growth.
Having looked at the attributes of one user, there is an indication of a trend that
could be used to distinguish one user from the next. More information about com-
paring users is needed, and more specifically how accurate the calculated profiles
are.
5.1.2 Profile Values
The KeyDown and KeyWait values granulates from 0 - 1500 microseconds (µs).
This contributes for the average of a set of login samples. The sKeyDown and
sKeyWait are derived from the uncertainty (variation) of the samples in the set of
logins.
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5.1.3 Entropy / Uncertainty
In a set of samples of n length there is variability in the different keystrokes. This
uncertainty in the data population for each keystroke (x) is calculated through
standard deviation. It defines the root mean square deviation from the mean, and
will directly indicate how wide the spread the values in the dataset are [45, 46].
The mean (average) value of one variable (x) in our dataset can be described as:
x =
(x1 + x2 + . . .+ xn)
n
(5.1)
The uncertainty can be formulated as:
σ =
√
1
n
∑
(xi − x)2 (5.2)
5.1.4 Profile Analysis
Looking at the deduced profiles one can identify several interesting aspects. Table
5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 show three example users, of different computer proficiency. User
14 is estimated at level 2 computer proficiency, User 11 at level 3 and User 1 at
level 4.
User 1 Profile
User 1
kd 112 88 134 120 89 83 107 117 85
kw 0 110 76 67 219 158 109 73 192
skd 20.54 10.91 14.48 12.70 11.33 13.65 19.32 11.17 10.51
skw 0.00 19.76 18.44 14.42 20.43 18.81 28.11 20.07 22.87
Table 5.2: Full user profile, with all logins for user 1.
User 1 (table 5.2 and figure 5.3) show a range from 83.0 µs to 134.0 µs KeyDown.
KeyWait on the other hand ranges from 73 to 219 µs. KeyDown standard deviation
ranges from 10.51 to 20.54 µs and for KeyWait 14.42 to 22.87 µs. Notice that
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Figure 5.3: A graphical representation of the KeyDown and KeyWait parameters,
with error bars showing deviation, for user 1.
KeyWait and sKeyWait will always be 0 as there is no waiting period before typing
in the first character.
User 11 Profile
User 11
kd 95 80 230 140 97 90 97 99 77
kw 0 244 386 151 480 465 364 405 213
skd 9.56 8.62 30.60 20.40 11.57 12.70 9.55 10.36 10.22
skw 0.00 54.27 119.86 21.39 253.85 226.92 268.03 224.16 46.82
Table 5.3: Full user profile, with all logins for user 11.
User 11 (table 5.3 and figure 5.4) KeyDown have values from 77.0 to 230.0 µs,
not that different from the first user. Looking at KeyWait however the table offer
values from 151.0 to 480.0 µs. This indicates a longer waiting period between
characters than User 1. The uncertainty of KeyDown ranges from 8.62 to 30.60
µs and KeyWait from 46.82 to 253.85 µs. A higher range of variation indicate less
familiarity with the password.
The fact that standard deviation on KeyDown is higher than the two other sub-
jects is not given proper emphasis in the figure 5.4 due to the extreme values of
KeyWait and sKeyWait. The graphical representation will therefore not show the
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Figure 5.4: A graphical representation of the KeyDown and KeyWait parameters,
with error bars showing deviation, for user 11.
differences in these parameters, but it can be read from the profile table 5.3. It
will also be given more attention in the comparison sections. It does display the
difference between KeyDown and KeyWait when focusing on the time property.
Compared to user 1, the results show a huge value difference in KeyWait. This
gives reason to hope a difference in profiles which would differentiate the users.
User 14 Profile
User 14
kd 81 79 120 84 83 88 88 84 83
kw 0 920 467 208 589 493 336 449 489
skd 10.15 7.74 81.42 9.55 9.99 9.90 8.57 8.86 7.41
skw 0.00 660.11 221.29 76.18 416.17 512.98 113.43 237.98 379.22
Table 5.4: Full user profile, with all logins for user 14.
The last user in this example, User 14 (table 5.4 and figure 5.5), show a KeyDown
range of 83.0 to 120.0. Notice the consistency in KeyDown average values. Key-
Wait on the other hand springs from 208 to 920 µs. Looking at the deviation it
proves to be between 7.41 to 81.42. This said, 8 of the 9 keystrokes runs close
to 10, and one near 82. The anomaly keystroke spawns from the third character,
namely the shift button. Standard deviation for the KeyWait period also varies
greatly. Almost evenly distributed from 113.43 to 660.11. Considerably higher
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Figure 5.5: A graphical representation of the KeyDown and KeyWait parameters,
with error bars showing deviation, for user 14.
than the other two profiles show. This user appears to be a very consistent but
slow typist.
User 14 has the highest sKeyWait of all the profiles created. This may indicate
that a vast number of users could succeed in having behavior which could falsely
but successfully fall under the profile of this user. Large deviations increase the
possibility for samples from other users to fall within the allowed limits. But still
depend on the original KeyWait level, to make a successful comparison.
5.1.5 Sample Remarks
User KeyDown time KeyWait time Total Time
User 1 935 1004 1939
User 11 1005 2708 3713
User 14 790 3951 4741
Table 5.5: Accumulated time values comparison, for users 1, 11 and 14, with
respect to KeyDown, KeyWait and Total time in µs.
Looking at table 5.5 the three user profiles are listed in descending order by com-
puter proficiency. An interesting fact to remark is the total time versus the total
KeyDown time. Even though user 1 is almost 2800 µs faster than user 14, the
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User KeyDown σ KeyDown σ avg KeyWait σ KeyWait σ avg. Total σ
User 1 124,61 13,85 162,91 20,36 287.52
User 11 123,58 13,73 1214,30 151,78 1337,88
User 14 153.59 17,06 2617,36 327,17 2770,95
Table 5.6: Deviation comparison for users 1, 11 and 14. Showing total and mean
KeyDown deviation, total and mean KeyWait deviation, and total deviation.
KeyDown time of the user 1 is higher than that of user 14. This indicate that the
KeyDown characteristic has no direct relation to the proficiency level. The Key-
Wait time on the other hand, can be related to the given proficiency level for these
users. This may also be a case of the users ability to memorize the password.
Table 5.6 gives an overview of the deviation range of the three users. Considering
the consistency of user 1 and 11, a low deviation average of 14 pr. character for
KeyDown can be identified. User 14 show close to 17 range standard deviation
value pr character. Combining this knowledge with the information shown in table
5.5 gives hope to differentiate users. User 14, which has the lowest KeyDown
time, has the highest deviation. Users 1 and 11 have similar KeyDown time and
KeyDown deviation, however there is a large difference between the KeyWait and
sKeyWait of these two users.
User 1 has a sKeyWait of 163 pr character in KeyWait, while user 11 and 14 are
at 1214 and 2617 average deviation range. A concern at this point would be to
separate the two latter users 11 and 14. But the difference in KeyDown could
make this possible. The conclusion of this comparison, is that the data range and
deviation range, considering both KeyDown and KeyWait, should be large enough
to make an accurate match between the users.
Comparing these initial results with the estimated proficiency level of users (for
all users, not only the selected ones in this section), makes way for the following
argument: The lower proficiency level, the higher KeyWait and sKeyWait. This
does not reflect the truth for KeyDown and sKeyDown, where the samples are
spanning over less value differences. Anomalies can be found for both KeyDown
and KeyWait, and thus the conclusion can only be an indication.
The figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 represent the behavior of users on KeyDown, Key-
Wait, sKeyDown and sKeyWait. The value differences are so vast, that a conclu-
sion cannot be drawn from this. The uncertainty is very high for many users. To
show this, a comparison of all users with focus on the false acceptance rate (FAR)
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and false rejection rate (FRR) is needed5.
5.2 Value Test
The two terms accuracy and precision is used to tell the quantifying difference in
a set of data values. Accuracy is the degree of veracity (how close to the mean the
values are) whilst the precision is the degree of reproducibility (how the results
scatter) 6.
One weakness of using mean and standard deviation, is the lack of ability to rec-
ognize outliers or high anomalies which can corrupt the end result. For example
the dataset {1, 1, 2, 3, 114} will give a mean value of 24.2, while a median would
be 2. The standard deviation will describe how spread the dataset is, but would not
know the difference of two anomalies and one anomaly with the value of the two
combined. So even if the profile is based on an accurate dataset, no knowledge of
the precision is presented.
In the Value test, all the login attempts for all users are tested as attacks on all
profiles. Each character x from a user sample X for both KeyDown and KeyWait,
is compared to the matching character y of a profile Y . The accepted precision
level (l) of uncertainty, is set before conducting the comparison. The lower the
precision level l (standard deviation level), the harder a positive match will be to
accomplish. A high l will accept higher uncertainty in the dataset. For example,
where l is set to 1, xi will have to be within the limits of yi ±σ yi. For an accep-
tance rate of 3 times the standard deviation xi will have to be within the limits of
yi ±(3*σyi).
In a normal Gaussian distribution, the standard deviation of a dataset is defined
at precision level 1. It can be identified as a bell curve, identical on both sides
of a mean. In a large dataset, and by definition, 68% of the data will be within
1 standard deviation (symmetrical with 34% on both sides). This accuracy rate
is not accurate enough for a positive match as almost 35% of all logins would be
considered anomalies. By doubling the standard deviation, 95% of the samples
would be accepted. And 99.7% would be within 3 standard deviation, by the
distribution definition known as the empirical rule [46, 45].
5The FAR would be where an intruder is falsely accepted into the system, while the FRR is
where a legitimate users is rejected.
6A section on accuracy and precision can be found in the appendix B.2.
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The level of success will be described as access (a) or positive match within the
set limits for KeyDown and KeyWait. Higher or lower values than the profile
value yi ± lσ, will be considered anomalies. Where this is true, akd or akw will
be increased by one.
The akd describe the number of alerts or errors detected for the KeyDown param-
eter. Accordingly the akw value describe the alerts or errors were raised from the
KeyWait parameter.
The following algorithm 1 describes the comparison done:
Algorithm 1 Value test: Login sample comparison algorithm
1: for all logins do
2: i =1
3: akd =0
4: akw =0
5: for i = 1 to 9 do
6: if xkd ≥ ykd+ σl then
7: akd = akd+ 1 {If exceeding kd upper limit}
8: else if xkd ≤ ykd− σl then
9: akd = akd+ 1 {If exceeding kd lower limit}
10: end if
11: if xkw ≥ ykw + σl then
12: akw = akw + 1 {If exceeding kw upper limit}
13: else if xkw ≤ ykw − σl then
14: akw = akw + 1 {If exceeding kw lower limit}
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
5.2.1 Alert Levels
When conducting the Value test (see Algorithm 1), for each login an Alert Level
can be selected from the variable a. An additional algorithm 2 is run to determine
Alert Level. If the sample had no errors for akd and akw would be 0, it one error
could be found it would contain 1. To gather data, the algorithm stores the results
in global variables al0 through al4 (Alert Level group 0, 1, 2, 3 and 4), akdtot and
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akwtot. These can be used to place the login within an Alert Level, and give an
error distribution between akd and akw. This will enable the study of how many
logins that were rejected, and the reason for the rejection. No regard is paid to the
question of whether it was lower or higher than the limits allowed.
Algorithm 2 Alert level algorithm
1: al0...al4 =0
2: for all logins do
3: akdtot = akdtot+ akd {Increase statistics}
4: akwtot = akwtot+ akw
5: atot = akd+ akw {Total errors for login}
6: if atot ≤ 0 then
7: al0 = al0 + 1 {Increase alertgroup 0}
8: else if atot ≤ 1 then
9: al1 = al1 + 1 {Increase alertgroup 1}
10: else if atot ≤ 2 then
11: al2 = al2 + 1 {Increase alertgroup 2}
12: else if atot ≤ 3 then
13: al3 = al3 + 1 {Increase alertgroup 3}
14: else
15: al4 = al4 + 1 {Increase alertgroup 4}
16: end if
17: end for
The Alert Level can be viewed as the level of strictness. If only Alert Level 0 is
accepted, there is no tolerance for errors. There are eighteen (one pr character
for both KeyDown and KeyWait) tests in total for each login. Failing for every
keystroke, atot would contain the value 18. Alert Level1 will accept one deviation
from the eighteen tests. This gives a flexibility to adjust the strictness of the test.
The distribution of errors can also be seen with the changing of standard deviation
level.
5.2.2 Full Profile FAR and FRR
The Value test is run for each standard deviation from 1.5 to 4 in order to find the
lowest accepted FAR and FRR. The figure 5.6, show the FAR and FRR for Alert
Level 0, with no mistakes accepted.
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Figure 5.6: Representation of the False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection rate
for standard deviation levels from 1.5 to 4, in percent (%).
The point where the FAR and FRR graphs cross, is the best possible outcome
of the test. The standard deviation level in this point is at about 3.2, and it will
result in a 12% false rejection rate and 12% false acceptance rate. A standard
deviation of 3.2 should include more than 99.7% of the data to be within the
standard deviation for the dataset of FRR. As only 88% of the samples for FRR is
within the limits in the test, it indicates a change in the data pattern.
Increasing the accepted Alert Level to include one acceptable error (Alert Level 0
and Alert Level1), the graph (figure 5.7) shows the result.
Notice the increased steepness of both graphs. This indicates a higher precision
with one error is accepted. Observe that both FAR and FRR are now crossing in
around 2.7 standard deviation of the mean. By definition this should include more
than 95% of the logins for FRR, however there is still only around 88% of the
logins which are accepted as correct logins. And also the same amount of FAR
where misuse has not been detected. There is no change in the accept or reject
rate. Thus the accuracy of the data does not change with this setup. Again this
indicates a change in the data collected over time. This is based on the fact that
random numbers would not change if the dataset is large enough. This concludes
that the numbers are infact not totaly random, but is affected by some (unknown)
factor. It is believed that this factor is training.
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Figure 5.7: Representation of the False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection rate
for standard deviation levels from 1.5 to 4, in percent (%). Accepting Alert Level
1 (one deviation from sample to profile).
5.2.3 Error Distribution
To gain more knowledge of where or why data does not match, a histogram of
login error rate was created (5.8).
A user (user19) was selected for this example to show distribution. The y-axis
show the number of errors for sample X , and the type of rejection (KeyDown or
KeyWait). The x-axis presents a timeline from the first to the last successful login
sample. A noticeable higher rate of errors spawn from the first 20 logins compared
to the last 20. Such a trend displays an increased accuracy in typing, and a high
rate of variability in the earliest logins.
5.3 Profile Growth
This section will discuss the profile growth and learning phase problems encoun-
tered in the results. An unacceptable FRR has been uncovered for the Value test
conducted. However the majority of rejected logins with a valid user name and
password, can be traced to the earliest of login samples. Therefore an investi-
gation into the growth of a profile, meaning how the samples change over time
and as the password gets more and more familiar, is needed to give more reliable
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Figure 5.8: Alert distribution histogram showing the first 40 login samples for
user 19.
results.
In order to show how profiles grow, the samples of each user is divided into two
chunks. The first being the first 50% of the login attempts and the second being
the last 50% of the login attempts. By directly comparing these for all users, a
growth trend could be detected.
It is important to focus a bit on how the samples are collected, and how passwords
are entered into the application. As discussed previously the users have gone
through sessions each consisting of 15 logins. After each attempt the password
should be easier and easier to remember. One problem when looking at user
profile growth is that this is not accurately mirroring how a real world scenario
would look like. The learning phase could start with many repeated logins to
enable a base for a basic profile. But rarely a repeated 15 login attempt session
would be conducted. A problem could arise between login 15 and 16, as there may
be (and in this study is) a week between each session. Keystroke Dynamics is a
quite sensitive biometric and one of the major issues is removing large anomalies
in the learning phase. The data in these experiments is not necessarily absolutely
accurate to a real life situation, and could possibly enable outliers and unwanted
large differences between two consecutive logins, with a larger real world time
gap between them.
Another fact to recognize is the way a repetitive process affect a person. When
conducting the exact same action over and over, a clear and consistent profile
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could emerge from that. But the environment around the person could change.
Some disturbance when entering the data could happen. A slip of the finger, or
a consecutive run of incorrect login could make a user concentrate harder, and
in such alter the behavior of previous attempts. In our data some few samples
are very different than the overall behavior. In a real implementation of such a
system, these data would be discarded. For gathering data on the other hand, this
is important information to collect. The next section will present data, without the
outliers, to get a more accurate statistic of the growth of a profile. Four profile
attributes (from users 18 and 25) is disregarded from the KeyWait and sKeyWait
samples. This is done only for the profile growth, not for any of the other tests.
When conducting these comparisons, two methods are selected for each category.
Both the mean value, and the median of samples are calculated. Median is a
stronger method in order to detect high anomalies, whereas mean is better at giv-
ing the general behavior. In other words, to detect the precision of the sample
growth, median is used. In order to gain knowledge about the accuracy of the
sample growth, the mean value is calculated.
The first profile from the first 50% logins is labeled p1, the second profile with the
last 50% of the logins is labeled p2. One assumption is that as the familiarity and
training of the passwords, the p2 would consist of lower values than p1 in general.
The following formula was used for this comparison:
growthrate =
p2
p1
(5.3)
KeyDown Growth
The property of KeyDown characteristics has shown to be more consistent with
lower standard deviation values, compared to KeyWait. The table 5.7 shows the
growth summary for all users in percent (%). If the value is equal to 0, no growth
is detected. A value of 5 means the average growth has been reduced by 5% from
the newest to the earliest profile. A negative value tells of a increased growth time.
This is also the case for the table 5.8.
As table 5.7 indicate, a general low growth rate can be found in most of the charac-
ters in the password. The highest average rate can be found in characters 1 and 6,
with a 10% time decrease. The best median growth keystrokes are the characters
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Char 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Avg. 10,7 5,2 1,8 4,2 3,5 10.1 0,2 1,7 3,0
Med. 7,4 3,0 5,5 3,0 3,4 7,4 2,9 2,0 2,3
Avg.σ 14,9 8,9 22,7 2,8 -21,8 23,4 0,6 -6,0 13,0
Med.σ 15,2 8,3 31,3 11,5 -5,6 23,4 11,3 -3,6 9,2
Table 5.7: KeyDown profile growth comparison for each keypress, in percent (%).
1 and 6, with a decrease of 7%.
Looking at the deviation rates, the average for character 3, is 22% growth re-
duction which is the highest in the dataset. This would be the shift-key in the
password. The 5th has a negative precision by almost 22%. The median for this
character shows an increased deviation of 5%, which indicate a few high anoma-
lies for this keystroke. However, an increased value (rank is above 0) show that
the general growth is not as good as the other characters. The best growth rate for
deviation can be found in character 3, with a 31% decrease. This, as mentioned,
is the Shift-Key.
In general most values have decreased, and can be found more consistent in the
latter profile. The median show better growth than the mean in most keystrokes.
But some few values are also higher. This means that the precision is generally
growing more than the accuracy, but both values are decreasing over time.
KeyWait Growth
In previous tests the range of values for KeyWait and sKeyWait have been gener-
ally higher than KeyDown and skd. There could be a potential for higher growth
in these values. The table 5.8 show the results of the profile comparison.
Char 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Avg. 26,6 3,3 5,7 17,8 4,9 25,5 10,5 20,8
Med. 22,9 6,3 12,3 18,9 22,8 24,7 22,4 17,6
Avg.σ 39,7 2,1 4,5 -12,1 11,8 38,7 47,2 40,5
Med.σ 65,0 24,5 27,9 -3,5 58,0 72,8 49,5 46,9
Table 5.8: KeyWait profile growth comparison for each keypress, in percent (%).
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There can be found a higher variation of growth in the KeyWait parameter. Notice
that the first character cannot be improved as it is always 0, and has been removed
from the table as it has no significance to the results. The average KeyWait shows
all character time values have decreased. The best growth can be found in char-
acter 2, 7 and 9, with 26%, 25% and 21%. The minimum growth can be found
in character 3, which is somewhat unexpected. This can however suggest that
there is a defined pattern concerning the Shift-key since it is dependent on another
keystroke to complete, and its value is not dependent on itself alone as the other
keystrokes are.
The median growth rates are always performing better than the average except
for character 9. The lowest growth can also here be found in character 3 with
only 6%. The best on the other hand are characters 2, 6, 7 and 8. All ranging
from 20-22% decrease. Knowing that the profiles roam from generally 100 - 800
µs, an increase of 20% will mean a time decrease with 20-160 µs, which can be
described as a high time improvement rate.
When examining the mean deviation values in the table, the average span from
47.2 to -12.1. The fifth character is the one following the release of the shift-
button, and has the worst growth rate. It actually increases with 12%. The charac-
ters 2, 7, 8 and 9 decreases with almost 40 - 50%. The consistency of typing has
on average improved more on the sKeyWait parameter than any other parameter
in the tests. This also goes to prove the assumption stated that it had the highest
improvement potential from the dataset.
The median values are consistently lower than the average, and quite a bit so. One
can find in characters 7 and 2 with a decreased median rate of a stunning 65% and
73%. Character 2 is located close to character 1, and training seem to improve
the time between these two. Character 7 on the other hand have no location or
pattern wise qualities which could explain this phenomenon. A password pos-
sesses the trait of being memorable, but only for a given number of consecutive
characters. This character 7 key, could be where the natural flow begins to fail,
and a pause to remember the password sequence is needed. After repeated entries
the entire password comes quickly to mind. There are no data that implies this
is wrong, although no signs that this is a general trend could be found from the
earlier evaluation of profiles.
The human short-time memory is able to store 7 (plus or minus 2) pieces of in-
formation [47, 48]. The limited capacity can be a possible reason to explain the
latter growth phenomena. With training, the brain puts two pieces of information
(keystrokes) into one piece, which reduces the total number of pieces in the infor-
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mation, and it becomes easier to remember. When the entire information set is put
into one piece only, it is transferred into the long-term memory. This can explain
the unusual growth rate of character 7. The brain process it, and merge several
characters into one piece. Thus no pause is needed to think when entering the
password. This is an interesting observation, and would need more investigation
to be proved.
Comparison Overview
Looking at the bigger picture, a table 5.9 was created to show the total average
and median growth for KeyDown, sKeyDown, KeyWait, sKeyWait, calculated
from the growth rate of all characters. Again, a high positive number refers to
better and more consistent user behavior.
Type KeyDown sKeyDown KeyWait sKeyWait
Mean 4,5 6,5 14,4 21,5
Median 4,1 11,2 18,5 36,2
Table 5.9: Total growth comparison with mean and median values, for the param-
eters KeyDown, KeyWait, KeyDown deviation and KeyWait deviation, in percent
(%)
One can find a growth rate of about 5% for the KeyDown parameter, and a slightly
better improvement rate for the sKeyDown. There is definitely a growth in the
KeyDown characteristics behavior. And it becomes more consistent by 6-11% pr.
character when looking at mean and median values. This may not be enough to
have significant impact on the FAR and FRR, but could cause some differences
due to the growth. Because of the difference in mean and median values, some
anomalies could be expected, and impact the FRR.
KeyWait on the other hand have an average decreasing growth of 14% and the
median shows 18% improvement. This could cause some direct impact on the test
results for FRR and FAR. The sKeyWait average and median shows an improve-
ment rate of 22 - 36% pr. character for all users. This implies a greatly improved
consistency, and could mean a much lower FAR, if only the last 50% of the logins
were used for tests and profiling.
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5.3.1 Value Test on Grown Profiles
The growth of KeyWait and sKeyWait has shown indications of being influential.
More influential than KeyDown and sKeyDown. In order to see its significance,
another Value test was performed. The profiles were now based only on the last
50% of the successful logins. For FAR, all logins are tested against all new pro-
files. For FRR, only the last 50% of the logins are tested against the new profile
of that user. This creates huge statistical difference, due to the fact that over 3000
logins will be tested for FAR pr. user, and a maximum of 30 logins can be tested
for the FRR, as this approach cuts the number of logins by 50%. A statistical
golden rule is: a minimum of 30 data samples is sufficient to get a valid result.
More than 30 is often appreciated [45].
The first Value test was applied with no errors accepted in any of the 18 tests.
Remembering the similar test done on a complete profile (figure 5.6), a standard
deviation value of 3.2 gave the best result. As accepted profile ranges have become
tighter, the rates should go down and stay generally lower for this test. For the
FRR on the other hand, the profiles have also become more consistent, and not as
open to errors as earlier. The general behavior of the users has with the growth
of the profiles, also become stronger and more consistent. This could also lead to
more similar typing.
The figure 5.9 shows the result of the new Value test.
Looking at the FAR graph (in figure 5.9) compared to the FAR graph for a full
profile (figure 5.6), the accuracy has increased significantly. Even at standard de-
viation level 3, there are only 1% falsely accepted users out of the 3900 login
attempts. This is 1/10 of the rate from a full profile. When increasing the al-
lowed deviation even more, only a low increase in FAR % is found. At a standard
deviation level of 4 (which is the max in these tests), the FAR is 6.87%. For a
full profile the same allowed deviation level has a 24.76% false acceptance rate.
This indicate a significant improvement in user verification, as the consistency has
improved, making it easier to differentiate users.
Furthermore, the FRR has not improved. On the contrary it seems to reject more
legitimate users on all standard deviation levels. Because of the increased consis-
tency, also the accepted limits for FRR is stricter. Deviations in behavior which
was accepted earlier would now be rejected. At a standard deviation level of 4, 7
out of 100 would experience rejected logins.
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Figure 5.9: False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection Rate results on increasing
standard deviation acceptance level from 1.5 to 4. Using type two profiles (last
50% of the logins), accepting no errors.
Because of the extremely low FAR, there could be room for looking at a slightly
less conservative acceptance rate. The Value test was run again, now with one
error (one deviation from the profile in either KeyDown or KeyWait) acceptance.
The experience from this same operation for a full profiled proved to reduce the
standard deviation level point, but increasing the percent rate for FAR and reduce
the FRR. It is expected that this would be the result of this test. The result is
shown in figure 5.10.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the FRR greatly improved. At a standard deviation level
of 2.5, an FRR of 14% can be achieved. The FAR for this deviation level is 1.41%,
which can be considered as very low. The linear pattern which could be found for
Alert Level 0, now has bends and turns. That is a sign of the variation levels in
the typing behavior the test are trying to detect. There are no significant changes
in FRR from 2.5 standard deviation to 2.7, where it again begins to drop. From
standard deviation level 2.9 to 4 there is a slow descending trend from 5.1% to
2.2%. Standard deviation level of 2.9 proves to be the meeting point of the graphs.
The FAR in this point is 5.02% and the FRR is 5.1%. This is a considerable
improvement in the FRR, while the FAR has only a slightly reduced rate, even
with a lower acceptance limit.
One approach to find the best suited allowed standard deviation level is to calculate
the mean error rate (MER), which is the mean value between the false acceptance
rate and the false rejection rate. This gives a good indication of where the best
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Figure 5.10: False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection Rate results on increasing
standard deviation acceptance level from 1.5 to 4. Using type two profile (last 50%
of the logins), accepting one login sample error to deviate from the profile.
mean result could be found.
MER =
FAR
FRR
(5.4)
Another approach which is useful for studying the results is the Equal Error
Rate(EER). This is describing at which point (if any) the FRR and FAR is equal.
In table 5.10 the average percent rate between FRR and FAR has been calculated
for the standard deviation. The same data can be found with a graphical represen-
tation in figure 5.11.
The table 5.10 and figure 5.11 shows an increasing standard deviation from 1.5
to 4.0 from left to right. The four groups of Alert Levels (al0, al1, al2 and al3)
is represented in a row with the labels ’No errors’ (al0), ’One error’ (al1), ’Two
errors’ (al0) and ’Three errors’ (al3). The values are the mean between FRR and
FAR. When accepting no errors or deviations from the total of eighteen tests in
the Value test. The lowest rate is at 4.0 standard deviation at 7.11%. Notice the
linear value decrease as the allowed standard deviation level increases. The graph
is flattening out which can possibly mean it is reaching its lowest score before
increasing again.
As described in previous sections, by allowing one error, the average MER de-
creases and the differentiation of users can be done at lower standard deviation
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Deviation No errors One error Two errors Three errors
1.5 42.60 29.80 21.00 13.6
2.0 26.50 16.20 9.60 5.56
2.1 24.30 15.50 7.99 5.05
2.2 22.10 14.50 7.42 3.75
2.3 19.90 13.50 6.89 3.21
2.4 17.30 11.10 5.06 3.22
2.5 15.50 7.69 5.24 3.40
2.6 13.30 7.15 4.73 3.99
2.7 12.00 7.09 5.51 5.14
2.8 10.60 5.85 5.51 6.78
2.9 9.67 5.09 7.85 7.85
3.0 9.35 5.65 9.15 16.30
3.5 7.42 8.83 16.30 16.3
4.0 7.11 14.10 22.40 22.4
Table 5.10: Representation of the Mean Error Rate for an increasing deviation
level from 1.5 to 4.0, grouped by Alert level from none to three errors, in percent
(%). Notice that the MER and the deviation level is reduced when accepting
deviations from the profiles.
rates. The lowest value found in these tests were at 2.9 standard deviation with
one error acceptance, and is 5.09%. Make notice of the fact that the graph has
a worse result than al0 in higher standard deviation values (above 3.2). This is
because the FAR increases quite rapidly.
Adjusting the system for al2 (which allows two errors out of the eighteen) the
average MER is lower than with al1 with a standard deviation under 2.7. The
lowest value can be found at standard deviation level 2.6 at 4.73%.
The last Alert Level group (al3) accepts 3 errors out of the eighteen possible, and
proves to have a even lower MER than the other results. At an accepted standard
deviation rate of 2.3 a 3.21% average MER can be found. The figure 5.11 show
equal values for al2 and al3 at standard deviation rate 2.6. An interpretation of
this phenomenon can be explained with the data ranges. It shows a probable gap
between Alert Level 2/3 and Alert Level 4. There seems to be a limit of how the
behavior varies. There simply are no samples in al3 for this range of deviation.
Either a login have 2 errors, or it has 4 or more errors. This is an important point,
as this complies with the hypothesis that there indeed are differences between
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Figure 5.11: Graphical representation of the impact the Alert level, have on the
Mean Error Rate with increasing standard deviation from 1.5 to 4.
typing habits.
When studying these results there are some factors that needs to be clarified.
Earlier tests have proved the FAR rate to be considerably lower than the FRR.
This means that there are vast differences between users, but the users themselves
vary much in their behavior. The profile growth explains that the FRR actually
can increase after a profile growth period, because the consistency increase leads
to smaller accepted deviations. However by allowing some deviations, one can
achieve a 3.21% MER rate. To reduce this number even more, knowledge of what
kind of errors are represented, and how the errors distribute among the users, is
needed.
Error Distribution in percent (%)
Knowing the factor of FRR, a table 5.11 was created to visualize the distribution
of errors. In this example, a standard deviation level (l) of 2.8 is used. For each
user the number of successful logins was calculated in percent (%). Doing this
enables a closer study of the error distribution. Each range of 5% is given a ’range
slot’. The table shows how many percent of users had 100% successful logins,
95-99% successful logins and so on.
Make note that 64% of the users had no errors, which means that all the login
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attempts were successful. About 9% had over 95% of their logins accepted. No
users were in the group where 90-94% of their logins were successful. More
interestingly is the fact that 18% were within the range of 85% - 89%, and the rest
of the users (9%) had less then 84% successful logins.
This shows that there is of a gap between the users. The largest group (73%) is
always within 95% acceptance rate. There are however a group of users (around
27%) that generate a high amount of anomalous login attempts. The number of
samples for the last FRR test is weak in a statistical overview. Only 136 login
attempts can be tested. Outliers mentioned in the previous profile section, has
not been removed. Identified behavior in denied logins, only a few users generate
most of the errors.
Range Distribution
100 63,63
95 - 99 9,09
90 - 94 0
85 - 89 18,18
- 84 9,09
Total 100
Table 5.11: The table describes the error distribution for users, represented by
acceptance % error slots.
Though only a few of the users generates most of the errors, these are still valid
users in a real scenario of users. What can be learned from the distribution is that
not every user would have the same problem with logging in. After studying the
rejected logins, it is clear that the behavior is very different on some keystrokes,
and the decision to reject the login attempt seems to be correct.
When verifying the collected logins, 27% of the passwords was not matching
the original password. These logins had to be discarded to create valid profiles.
It however indicates that approximately every 3 out of 10 times a user type the
password incorrectly, with respect to the keyCode value ordering. This contributes
to a 30% FRR on password verification. Even when knowing the password well,
and having typed it often daily for a longer period of time, the password is still
entered incorrectly. Thus the human factor will always be a contributor to errors
when it comes to behavior, also so when it comes to typing behavior.
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Error Type Distribution
For each login sample in the Value test a counter was created. Each time a sample
character was outside of the allowed limits, the type of error was stored in order to
track what kind of errors were most frequent for each level of standard deviation.
Because of time restraints, the granularity of this does not include the different
Alert Levels. Figure 5.12 shows the distributed score for any KeyDown and Key-
Wait error in the test. One KeyDown is presented both for False Acceptance Rate
and False Rejection Rate, as is the KeyWait parameter. As the numbers are pre-
sented in percent (%), notice that the graphs are opposite symmetrical. When
KeyDown goes up, the KeyWait goes down with the same percent (%) value.
Figure 5.12: Error type distribution for False Acceptance Rate and False Rejection
Rate with KeyDown and KeyWait parameters.
An interesting observation for FAR (in the figure 5.12) is the distribution itself.
From a accepted 1.5 standard deviation level to 4.5 standard deviation, a less than
10% change is noticed. As the deviation levels increase, the frequency of KeyWait
is increasing slowly. It is somewhat easier to separate users on KeyWait errors
because of this.
When looking at the FRR, which has proved the most difficult to achieve, low stan-
dard deviation values seem to have higher accuracy for KeyDown than KeyWait.
This changes with increasing accepted standard deviation. With standard devia-
tion of 4, 80% of the errors detected are with the KeyWait property. The ranges
found most usable in the tests (deviation levels from 2.5 - 3.0) have changes from
10-40% between KeyDown and KeyWait.
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When considering these results, a suggestion can be made as the KeyDown is
more consistent because of the low FRR %. Most falsely rejected logins come
from deviations in KeyWait. The inconsistency for some users (see table 5.11)
mostly come from KeyWait. However when examining the FAR both KeyDown
and KeyWait are almost equally important to separate users.
5.4 Identification
The Identification test makes an effort to compare the current login sample to ev-
ery available profile. It defines each keystroke as a point in a graph and compares
the angle between the login sample and the profile keystroke. This makes every
keystroke parameter, a dimension in a multidimensional graph of n dimensions.
When attempting to reject intruder logins from the keystroke parameters, as many
parameters as possible is used in order to make the correct decision. The section
on profile growth and the Value test give knowledge of the data and the uncertainty
of data. Based on this a hypothesis can be made: An accurate identification will
be easier using the least deviating parameters of a login process.
It is as important to identify users whose access is denied upon login, as it is to
identify users who have accessed a system through another user account, making
use of a password that is no longer secret.
5.4.1 General Identification
For a general identification, the test is looping through all logins. The result is
a list of the top three closest candidate profiles. Algorithm 3 loops through all
login samples, and for each login makes an identification comparison against all
available profiles. It stores the top three (angle closest to 0) hits in variables. After
looping through all the profiles these values are stored in the db table tblTestResult
(db details in section 4.4.4).
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Algorithm 3 Identification test comparison and sort
1: for all logins do
2: first = 1
3: second = 1
4: third = 1
5: for all profiles do
6: θ = RUN : identAlgorithm {details in equation 3.6}
7: if θ ≥ first then
third = second second = first first = current
8: else if θ ≥ second then
third = second second = current
9: else if θ ≥ third then
third = current
10: end if
11: end for
12: RETURN orderedListToDB
13: end for
5.4.2 Analyzing Test Results
In order to obtain the best result, the test was run with different settings. The
following tests were conducted:
KeyDown Full 1. KeyDown Full Profile test will compare the sample to a full
profile, disregarding the growth rate for KeyDown time.
KeyDown Half 1. KeyDown Half Profile test, consists of the last 50% of the
samples as the profilebase, but only the KeyDown parameter is used.
KeyDown and KeyWait Full 1. KeyDown and KeyWait Full Profile use both the
KeyDown and the KeyWait parameters, with a full profile comparison
KeyDown and KeyWait Half 1. In the KeyDown and KeyWait Half Profile test,
both KeyDown and KeyWait time is used, but only the last 50% samples as profile
When conducting these tests, some specific login types were not included. Be-
cause of the difference found when using different terminal types, only keyboard
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type 3 (laptop keyboard) was used. The uncertainty (variation) in the data is
smaller, and thus will increase accuracy for logins. In a real time scenario one
can never know if the intruder uses his/her regular terminal for logging in. In or-
der to ensure quality in the result, only samples with similar conditions could be
used.
Through the profile growth analyzing phase, it became apparent that KeyDown
has a lower uncertainty (higher consistency) in general than KeyWait. This is why
a test with only KeyDown and one with KeyDown and KeyWait was run. It was
expected that the success rate would be higher with only the KeyDown parameter.
When saving the top three closest profiles to a sample, it is also possible to deter-
mine the distribution of the hit rate. After the verification test, a test to compare
the identification position, to the actual login user was done. If the original user
was first on the list, the test is classified as first hit. If the actual user was found
in the second position of the result list, the test is classified as second hit. And
for the third position, the classification would be third hit. If the actual user was
not found in any of the top three spots, the test would be classified as unsuccess-
ful for identifying the user. In these tests all the login attempts for all users were
used (except the samples mentioned), regardless of failing or succeeding in actu-
ally logging in (succeed in the Value test). This is interesting as it gives an initial
knowledge of how hard it is to identify users in general.
kd full kd half kd and kw full kd and kw half
First hit 64.84 62.24 60.42 56.77
Second hit 6.77 9.90 9.64 8.07
Third hit 3.39 2.86 5.99 4.69
Top three 75.00 75.00 76.04 69.53
Unsuccessful 25.00 25.00 23.96 30.47
Table 5.12: Identification success in percent (%), for KeyDown full profiles, Key-
Down half profile (last 50% of samples only), KeyDown and KeyWait full profiles,
KeyDown and KeyWait half profiles (last 50% of samples only).
The table 5.12 shows the result for the four test types and the hit rate for each test
classification. The best success rate can be found with a KeyDown full profile test
with 64.84% accurate matches. There is a 75% chance for the user to be amongst
the top three users. Only for 10% of the logins, could the user be found among
the second or third position. This indicate that the user behavior for most logins
are either accurate or inaccurate, as only a few could be found in the list without
a first hit match.
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For KeyDown half profile one should expect a better accuracy rate as there are less
uncertainty in the KeyDown parameter with training in entering the password. But
this is only true when comparing with the last 50% of the samples. There is no
knowledge of how many attempts or how strong an intruder profile is. This is why
no tests are run for only the latter half of the login attempts in the Identification
test. Doing such a test would give a better result, but it is improbable that an
intruder has written the password enough time to get a good flow. We do not care
about the success or failiure to enter as another user, merely looking at how easily
a user is recognizable in a given input from a keyboard.
Classification success was reduces by 2.6%, but increased for second hit classifi-
cation by attaining a 9.9% hit rate. With a 2.86% third hit result, a total of 75% of
the original user in the logins could be identified among the top three users. This
nuber is exactly the same as with a KeyDown Full sample test. This is an indi-
cation to suggest a low profile growth for KeyDown. The number of successful
identifications of first hit decreases somewhat, which probably come from early
logins which no longer match the profile when the training gets better. It is how-
ever somewhat surprising that the number of unsuccessful identifications did not
increase. Even with the profile growth, the KeyDown parameters still lie close to
the profile for both profile types.
The test with both parameters for full profiles was expected to be lower compared
to only one parameter because of the high standard deviation of KeyWait. With
a successful identification of user for first class of 60.42% the expectations were
met. The KeyWait can be considered more fragile than KeyDown, but interest-
ingly enough the third hit classification group increased so the total amount where
the original user could be found in one of the three top classifications actually
increased by 1.04% compared to the first two tests.
The trend found in KeyDown half profile also became apparent for both parameter
half profile test. The total identification rate is found as low as 69.53% with a
successful first hit rate of 56.77%.
Looking at the entire picture raises argument to continue with only the KeyDown
parameter. This is where the identification rate of first hit is the highest, even if a
combined KeyDown and KeyWait full profile test gives a higher top three rate, it
is considered more essential to attain first hit successful classifications.
89
CHAPTER 5. RESULTS
Identifying Falsely Accepted Users
One of the goals of the test is to indicate the original user behind a hacked login.
With this comes the ability to find the actual user that falsely succeeded to login
as another user. For accomplishing this the tests which was tagged as falsely
accepted in the tblTestResult as tested for genuine original user. Again the three
levels of classification is used. The table 5.13 presents the result of the test.
First hit 50.76
Second hit 8.20
Third hit 3.65
Top three 62.61
Unsuccessful 37.39
Table 5.13: Identification of falsely accepted users in the Value test in percent (%)
A decrease in successful first hit identifications can be shown in 50.76%, but also
an increase in second hit classifications with 8.20% identification rate. A total
of 62.61% of the users could be identified within the three classification groups,
and accordingly a 37.39% could not be found among the top three most probable
groups.
5.5 Pattern Recognition Test
The Value test makes an attempt to set boundaries for accepting or rejecting a
login based on an average value and a deviation. The Identification test uses a
mathematical calculation to find the closest matching profile to a sample. None
of the above tests manage to catch user patterns. A user pattern is not based on
the values itself, but in the rhythm in which the characters are entered with. This
approach tries to catch whether the values in the login attempt increase where it
is supposed to increase, or decrease where it usually decreases, not as much how
much they go up or down. Depending on the distribution of the data, an approach
for multiple models can be selected.
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5.5.1 Wilcoxon Test
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test was the first model tested. An advantage with the
Wilcoxon test is the fact that it is independent of distribution. This could give an
indication to how distinguishable samples are. A description of the test can be
found in the appendix B.1.
The first step is to define a range to distribute the keystrokes scale. Our tests
will always have 18 parameters, over the interval 0 to 1500 (1500 µs is the max
latency for an allowed KeyWait and max KeyDown for a single keystroke). The
granularity of this scale would be too large, and not give a sufficient answer in the
comparison. The data obtained suggests a 15 µ latency in the input phase, so a
maximum effective scale would be 1500/15 = 100. This means every 15 µ will
have a scale slot, the first being values from 0 to 14, second being 15-29 etc. This
also proved to be too much granularity to be able to distinguish the users. So the
scale was set to 10 chunks. The number of samples for the users within one time
slot is counted and entered into the new scale.
Secondly, appropriate users must be selected. Looking at the tests user7 and
user11 had differences in behavior that should be sufficient to separate then in
such a test. The average of the first 30 samples for each of the users were used,
and the result entered into the correct time slot in the selected scale. Notice that
by doing this, the results have been ordered from lowest to highest in the scale.
User 7 User 11
Slot 0 6 5
Slot 1 13 9
Slot 2 4 11
Slot 3 3 3
Slot 4 3 2
Slot 5 0 0
Slot 6 1 0
Slot 7 0 0
Slot 8 0 0
Slot 9 0 0
Table 5.14: Slot distribution for Wilcoxon test
The table 5.14 shows the distribution of values over the selected slots. User 7
have 6 values in time slot 0, while User 11 has 5. For slot 1 the first user has 13
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and the second user only 9 values.
To calculate if there is a significant difference between the samples, different sig-
nificance levels can be chosen (0.1, 0.05 or 0.01). The higher number, the lower
need for difference is needed for a determination of significant difference. The
eye can see that the distribution of these data is different, especially for slot 2,
where user7 have 4 values and user11 11 values in that range.
The result of this test is that none of the significance levels make any distinctions
between the samples. This model cannot be used to distinguish pattern differences
between the user samples.
5.5.2 Other Models
Another model which has a flexible shape is the Weibull distribution model (de-
tails on the Weibull model can be found here [49]). One can choose the exponen-
tial, but the model is bound to a symmetrical pattern on both sides of the mean
value. No applicable result came out of using calculation with this model.
The extreme value distribution (details can be found in [50]), is not necessarily
symmetrical, but rather focus on an uneven distribution of values. One has the
flexibility to adjust the acceptance levels for testing the data. This model also
failed to acquire any statistical result which could be accepted.
When considering the profile growth, increasing accuracy and precision over time,
this could very well be the reason for the failing of these models. It is reasonable to
assume that fully grown profiles does not have as many anomal samples deviating
strongly from regular behavior. Also through some control unit when accepting a
login could also solve some of these problems to get more evenly distributed data.
This would be acceptable for a proof of concept test. In a real-life situation the
data are as they are, and the tests should be able to apply even if users have high
deviations in the enrollment phase.
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Conclusion
The primary goal of this thesis was to look at the limited security feature around
login processes. An application was developed for collecting login samples, with
the intent of building a database, used to study and analyze user keystroke be-
havior. Its main focus was detecting measurable differences with user typing
behavior, with respect to the parameters KeyDown time and KeyWait time. The
setup included a pre-decided password of 8 characters, with the total length of
9 keystrokes. Each individual user would, through an enrollment and learning
phase, establish a profile with behavior characteristics.
The main goal was accomplished through a Value test, developed to compare all
login samples to every profile, determining if a sample sufficiently correspond to
a previously recorded profile. Analyzing the entropy of the data samples, through
various accepted standard deviation levels, gave False Acceptance Rates and False
Rejection Rates, used to describe the vulnerability. The test proved increasingly
accurate when considering profile growth, because process repetition leads to in-
creased user behavior consistency.
Changing terminal type (for example from a laptop keyboard to desktop keyboard)
seem to sufficiently affect behavior, causing legitimate logins to be rejected in the
Value Test. It is advisable to regard each user profile dependent on the terminal
type, in which the profile entries are built.
Introducing Alert Levels, a method to accept a given number of anomalies, the
best result was found when allowing a standard deviation of 2.3 with 3 accepted
anomalies within the sample. A False Acceptance Rate of 2.25% was observed
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for this setting, and a False Rejection Rate of 4.17% obtained. The minimum
security threat (Mean Error Rate) identified, was 3.21%. It was found significantly
easier to differentiate users (acquire a low False Acceptance Rate), than to avoid
rejecting legitimate users (acquire a low False Rejection Rate). This conclusion is
supported by [4, 39].
Using techniques to evaluate error distribution, the KeyWait parameter was found
more effective in detecting behavior differences. It became apparent that a small
group (27% of the users), were generating most of the errors (almost 80%), which
affected the False Rejection Rate.
The goal of the Identification test was to identify the subject behind a login at-
tempt, when disregarding the username. It was developed to compare a sample to
every available profile, determining which profile is closest. This study was able
to correctly identify 65% of all login attempts, and approximately identify (sample
owner among the top three closest profiles) 75% of the users, based purely on the
sample values. Investigating logins which would be falsely accepted in the Value
test, 51% of the logins matched closest the profile of the hacker. This means that
51% of the hacks can be traced back to the imposter, when succeeding in logging
into another user account.
This study was unable to find an appropriate statistical model to accurately cor-
relate typing patterns to a specific user, or differentiate samples from multiple
users. The Pattern Recognition test made an effort to describe the data distribu-
tion model through; the Wilcoxon model, the Weibull distribution model and the
Extreme Value distribution.
This thesis made efforts in hardening a login authentication scheme. Furthermore,
identify illegitimate user logins, and combine results from the tests using joint de-
cision theory. Applying methods such as in this study can increase the security of a
traditional user authentication process by 97%. It can, with a 51% accuracy, iden-
tifying the user origin of a login hack, assuming the user has a registered profile.
Because of the identification rate and no pattern recognition results, there were not
enough conclusive parameters available, to make a combined test authentication
scheme.
Establishing user proficiency groups, made it possible to draw the following con-
clusions. Proficient users have less sample variation and are harder to break into,
but are also more vulnerable to rejected logins. Less proficient users increases
their typing consistency more and faster. Their inconsistent behavior increase the
possibility of being hacked, since more variation is accepted. It is feasible that a
94
malicious user would have highest probability of successfully hacking into a login
of a user at the same proficiency level.
The novelty of the work lies with the usage of Alert Levels, improving the overall
Mean Error Rate from 7.11% to 3.21%. It is also providing desirable flexibility
for an unknown required degree of security. The Identification test, based purely
on sample values, can also be considered unique for short pass phrases (like a
password). There are few studies which has achieved equal to, or more satisfying,
Mean Error Rate than this work. Joyce and Gupta [39] obtained an 8.31 % Mean
Error Rate, with a False Authentication Rate of as low as 0.25% as early as 1990.
No recent published work found has attained a better Mean Error Rate, using a
passphrase under the length of 15 keystrokes. Longer passphrases under different
circumstances have achieved a Mean Error Rate of 2.0% [51].
The cost, in terms of implementation and hardware, could be greatly reduced
compared to physical biometric methods. The administration cost would probably
remain the same for any system dealing with enrollment and profile building,
and human anomalies. It is considered relatively cheap in regards to resource
demands in a system. Ethically, a keystroke dynamic authentication scheme could
be considered less intrusive and less discriminating, as any user of the system
would always be able to enroll (Failed Enrollment Rate is 0), without giving away
any sensitive information.
A keystroke dynamic authentication implementation can be used to establish a
higher security level for a login scheme, in order to avoid compromised systems
due to password theft or the like. It will also stand very strong against computer
generated login attempts, because of the extremely low KeyDown and KeyWait
time. This having been said, a biometric keystroke dynamic feature as described,
is alone not sufficient for high security demanding environments.
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Discussion and Future Work
This section will focus on discussion around some of the challenges found in the
thesis. It will also shed light on weaknesses and suggest paths of improvement.
7.1 Samples
When analyzing and testing, it is very important to have a proper amount of data.
This work would benefit from having more samples and users. The task of acquir-
ing large amounts of data is formidable, especially with the time constraints of a
thesis in mind. Although the setup enabled using a sample both as an impostor lo-
gin and a genuine login for all users, the False Rejection Rate is based on samples
from one user only. Users with high variance or many anomaly logins, greatly
affect the end result. A larger amount of users could possibly even out, improve
or impair the test results.
An average profile growth from between 10-30% was observed for the training
phase. With only 60 logins for each user, it would be very interesting to see the
continuous growth after for example 100, 150 and 200 logins. It is expected that
both the False Acceptance Rate and the False Rejection Rate would improve with
even more samples.
In the learning phase, all samples were considered valid (assuming a correctly
ordered sequence of KeyCodes). This caused some problems due to samples with
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extreme values. This was discussed with respect to the difference between the
mean and the median rates of profile growth. High anomalies would increase the
chance of falsely accepted logins, and reduce the chance of falsely rejected logins.
It is however undesirable to base profiles on samples with high anomal values for
one or more keystrokes. A more strict set of rules could be applied in filtering
samples for a profile, to obtain more accurate profiles, which would result in more
trustworthy results.
7.2 Experiencing a false login
Unpublished research observes as high as a 30% of regular passwords entered
incorrectly. The natural reaction to a blocked login, would for many be to slow
down the typing and concentrate, to get the password right. When using keystroke
dynamic authentication, there is a high probability that the login would be rejected
because of extra “concentration” effort. This could result in a bad circle, ending
up with a very annoyed user.
The same goes for a person logging in when talking on the phone, drinking coffee
or being generally distracted. The suggested solution is imperfect, but enabling
the user to see what actually failed (wrong password or invalid sample), could
help solving this problem. On the other hand this would give a possible intruder
useful information.
7.3 Scalability
A login authentication process will take place on a client computer more often
than not. The client will send the obtained login sample to an authentication ser-
vice for verification. With a keystroke dynamic authentication module installed,
more data would have to be sent to the authentication server than compared to a
traditional authentication scheme. The server would also have to perform more
calculations for each login. This would increase the server load and network traf-
fic in a system, and increasingly so if there are many users with a high amount of
repeated logins. Making use of local copies and local calculations could solve this
issue. Implementing a keystroke dynamic authentication module is not expected
to make vital impact on system resources, due to the low amount of resources
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needed for the calculations, and the data transfers.
Another scalability problem could arise with a high amount of users on a system.
How this system would function in an environment of several thousand users, is
not known. The Identification test could positively identify only 64% of all users
in this setup. This rate would probably go down if there were a vastly increased
number of profiles to compare with. One solution could be to use more parameters
(include KeyWait). This should be inspected closer as further work.
7.4 Terminal Types
The problem of differentiating behavior for one user on multiple terminal types,
force some restraints onto a system like this. One learning phase for each terminal
type is a possible solution. Only a few users are frequently changing main termi-
nals, and those who do frequently access many different machines, often remote
login to these without physically move. However, there are examples of environ-
ments where this is not true, and a keystroke dynamic authentication model could
be less desirable as the administration of the system, and the training process,
would require a lot of time.
7.5 Proficiency
Three subjects were removed from the sample database, due to a low sample rate.
Because of invalid use of the shift-button, very few logins were accepted. A con-
straint of a maximum of 1500 µs KeyDown time is set by the keyboard. When
holding down a key longer than that, the keyboard signal will be repeated. This is
not visible in the login application, but can be read off the logs. All these samples
were disregarded by the KeyCode filtering, and not entered as valid samples. In
order to accept these samples, a more advanced filtering engine needs to be de-
veloped. This behavior is very characteristic for the subjects, and could be very
hard to mimic. There is a possibility of these users having a high deviation rate,
but because their behavior clearly differs greatly from the rest of the subjects, the
False Acceptance Rate would be very low. All these subjects were considered
to be at the lowest proficiency level, novice users. Deeper knowledge about this
could be interesting, as they could prove harder to hack then normal users.
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7.6 Biometric Alterations
A profile is defined by a usual behavioral pattern. Some events could possibly alter
the biometric behavior of a user. For example, breaking an arm or finger. Chances
are, behavior would be so different from the original profile, a new profile with
a new learning phase would have to be introduced. This is considered to be a
administrative problem.
7.7 Password Samples
Results presented in this work, is based on a setup where the password used is the
same for every user. This simulates an environment where all users, except for the
profile owner, are considered malicious. They have attained the password, and use
this information to access the system. Since they also go through a training phase,
the pattern, in which the password is written, will grow over time. One advantage
of this is that one can observe attacks throughout the entire growth process. This
give insight in how unique a profile is, compared both to a trained and an untrained
user.
In a real situation it is not probable that an intruder has spent time to train. In
that respect it would be plausible to assume that the behavior from the first login
attempts would be more like a real intruder. As this work has indicated, the ear-
lier logins have a smaller chance to succeed than after training, especially when
comparing to a fully grown profile. There is reason to believe, the False Accep-
tance Rate would decrease when testing only a few logins attempts with many
users, compared to many login attempts from few users, as has been the case in
this study.
It is also not probable that all users have selected the same password. If the profiles
are based on different passwords for each user, an interesting study would be
to see how writing patterns develop for completely different sets of passwords.
Another fact that could be investigated is looking at the values itself, disregarding
the KeyCodes. A study on how different typing behavior for any password string,
could give valuable information in how important the actual password phrase is,
compared to the KeyDown and KeyWait values. Especially interesting is the effect
this would have on the Identification test.
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A study of how different behavior grouped on specific keys or characters is also
suggested. Examining the differences between all users on keystroke a, b etc,
could also help understanding relationships between short keystroke combina-
tions, or one key only. This would also benefit a later study of free text user
identification. Expanding this study to investigate often used keystroke combina-
tions, for example the, could enable deeper knowledge to also improve free text
comparisons.
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Appendix A
Terms
This following chapter covers the main terminology used within the fields of com-
puter security, biometrics and intrusion detection. The following list describe the
terms in detail, and relate these to one another [52, 53, 3].
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Term Description
Active Attack An attack on the authentication protocol where the attacker trans-
mits data to the claimant or verifier. Examples of active attacks
include a man-in-the-middle, impersonation, and session hijack-
ing.
Active Impostor Ac-
ceptance
When an impostor submits a modified, simulated or reproduced
biometric sample, intentionally attempting to relate it to another
person who is an enrollee, and is incorrectly identified or verified
by a biometric system as being that enrollee.
Asymmetric keys Two related keys, a public key and a private key that are used to
perform complementary operations, such as encryption and de-
cryption or signature generation and signature verification.
Application Developer An individual entrusted with developing and implementing a bio-
metric application.
Attack An attempt to obtain a subscribers token or to fool a verifier into
believing that an unauthorized individual possess a claimants to-
ken.
Attempt The submission of a biometric sample to a biometric system for
identification or verification. A biometric system may allow more
than one attempt to identify or verify.
Authentication The process of establishing confidence in user identities. Often
comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is being
claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s template.
Contrast with ’Identification.’ The preferred biometric term is
’Verification.’
Automatic ID/Auto ID An umbrella term for any biometric system or other security tech-
nology that uses automatic means to check identity. This applies
to both one-to-one verification and one-to-many identification.
Behavioral Biometric A biometric which is characterized by a behavioral trait that is
learned and acquired over time rather than a physiological char-
acteristic.
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Biometric A measurable, physical characteristic or personal behavioral trait
used to recognize the identity, or verify the claimed identity, of an
enrollee. Often a image or template of a physiological attribute
(e.g., a fingerprint) that may be used to identify an individual. In
this document, biometrics may be used to unlock authentication
tokens and prevent repudiation of registration.
Biometric Application The use to which a biometric system is put. See also ’Application
Developer.’
Biometric Data The extracted information taken from the biometric sample and
used either to build a reference template or to compare against a
previously created reference template.
Biometric Engine The software element of the biometric system which processes
biometric data during the stages of enrollment and capture, ex-
traction, comparison and matching.
Biometric Identifica-
tion Device
The preferred term is ’Biometric System.’
Biometric Sample Data representing a biometric characteristic of an end-user as cap-
tured by a biometric system.
Biometric System An automated system capable of: capturing a biometric sample
from an end user; extracting biometric data from that sample;
comparing the biometric data with that contained in one or more
reference templates; deciding how well they match; and indicat-
ing whether or not an identification or verification of identity has
been achieved.
Biometric Technology A classification of a biometric system by the type of biometric.
Capture The method of taking a biometric sample from the end user.
Certification The process of testing a biometric system to ensure that it meets
certain performance criteria. Systems that meet the testing criteria
are said to have passed and are certified by the testing organiza-
tion.
Comparison The process of comparing a biometric sample with a previously
stored reference template or templates. See also ’One-To-Many’
and ’One-To-One.’
Claim of Identity When a biometric sample is submitted to a biometric system to
verify a claimed identity.
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Term Description
Claimant A person submitting a biometric sample for verification or identi-
fication whilst claiming a legitimate or false identity.
Closed-Set Identifica-
tion
When an unidentified end-user is known to be enrolled in the bio-
metric system. Opposite of ’Open-Set Identification.’
Credential An object that authoritatively binds an identity (and optionally,
additional attributes) to a token possessed and controlled by a per-
son.
Crossover Rate Synonym for ’Equal Error Rate.’
Cryptographic key A value used to control cryptographic operations, such as decryp-
tion, encryption, signature generation or signature verification.
This means that it must be as hard to find an unknown key or
decrypt a message, given the information exposed to an eaves-
dropper by an authentication, as to guess a random number of the
selected value. (See also Asymmetric keys, Symmetric key.)
Cryptographic strength A measure of the expected number of operations required to de-
feat a cryptographic mechanism.
Data integrity The property that data has not been altered by an unauthorized
entity.
Discriminant Training A means of refining the extraction algorithm so that biometric
data from different individuals are as distinct as possible.
End User A person who interacts with a biometric system to enroll or have
his/her identity checked.
End User Adaptation The process of adjustment whereby a participant in a test becomes
familiar with what is required and alters their responses accord-
ingly.
Enrollee A person who has a biometric reference template on file.
Enrollment The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference tem-
plates representing that person’s identity.
Enrollment Time The time period a person must spend to have his/her biometric
reference template successfully created.
Entropy A measure of the amount of uncertainty that an attacker faces to
determine the value of a secret. (Entropy is usually stated in bits.)
It is also used for measuring the uncertainty in a data set, meaning
the variance of a set of samples.
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Equal Error Rate When the decision threshold of a system is set so that the propor-
tion of false rejections will be approximately equal to the propor-
tion of false acceptances. A synonym is ’Crossover Rate.’
Extraction The process of converting a captured biometric sample into bio-
metric data so that it can be compared to a reference template.
Failure to Acquire Failure of a biometric system to capture and extract biometric
data.
Failure to Acquire Rate The frequency of a failure to acquire.
False Acceptance When a biometric system incorrectly identifies an individual or
incorrectly verifies an impostor against a claimed identity. Also
known as a Type II error.
False Acceptance Rate/
FAR
The probability that a biometric system will incorrectly identify
an individual or will fail to reject an impostor. Also known as the
Type II error rate.
False Match Rate Alternative to ’False Acceptance Rate’. Used to avoid confu-
sion in applications that reject the claimant if their biometric data
matches that of an enrollee. In such applications, the concepts of
acceptance and rejection are reversed, thus reversing the mean-
ing of ’False Acceptance’ and ’False Rejection.’ See also ’False
Non-Match Rate.’
False Non-Match Rate Alternative to ’False Rejection Rate’. Used to avoid confusion
in applications that reject the claimant if their biometric data
matches that of an enrollee. In such applications, the concepts
of acceptance and rejection are reversed, thus reversing the mean-
ing of ’False Acceptance’ and ’False Rejection.’ See also ’False
Match Rate.’
False Rejection When a biometric system fails to identify an enrollee or fails to
verify the legitimate claimed identity of an enrollee. Also known
as a Type I error.
False Rejection
Rate/FRR
The probability that a biometric system will fail to identify an
enrollee, or verify the legitimate claimed identity of an enrollee.
Also known as a Type I error rate.
Field Test A trial of a biometric application in ’real world,’ as opposed to
laboratory, conditions.
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Term Description
Goats Biometric system end users whose pattern of activity when inter-
facing with the system varies beyond the specified range allowed
by the system, and who consequently may be falsely rejected by
the system.
Genetic Penetrance The degree to which characteristics are passed from generation to
generation.
Identity A unique name of an individual person or another entity. Since
the legal names of persons are not necessarily unique, the identity
of a person must include sufficient additional information (for ex-
ample an address, username, or some unique identifier such as an
employee or account number) to make the complete name unique.
Identification/Identify The one-to-many process of comparing a submitted biometric
sample against all of the biometric reference templates on file to
determine whether it matches any of the templates and, if so, the
identity of the enrollee whose template was matched. The biomet-
ric system using the one-to-many approach is seeking to find an
identity amongst a database rather than verify a claimed identity.
Contrast with ’Verification.’
Impostor A person who submits a biometric sample in either an intentional
or inadvertent attempt to pass him/herself off as another person
who is an enrollee.
In-House Test A test carried out entirely within the environs of the biometric de-
veloper which may or may not involve external user participation.
Live Capture The process of capturing a biometric sample by an interaction
between an end user and a biometric system.
Man-in-the-middle
(MitM) attack
An attack on the authentication protocol run in which the attacker
positions himself in between the claimant and verifier so that he
can intercept and alter data traveling between them.
Match/Matching The process of comparing a biometric sample against a previously
stored template and scoring the level of similarity. An accept or
reject decision is then based upon whether this score exceeds the
given threshold.
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Network An open communications medium, typically the Internet, that is
used to transport messages between the claimant and other par-
ties. Unless otherwise stated no assumptions are made about the
security of the network; it is assumed to be open and subject to
active (e.g., impersonation, man-in-the-middle, session hijacking)
and passive (e.g., eavesdropping) attack at any point between the
parties (claimant, verifier, relying party).
Off-line attack An attack where the attacker obtains some data (typically by
eavesdropping on an authentication protocol run, or by penetrat-
ing a system and stealing security files) that he/she is able to ana-
lyze in a system of his/her own choosing.
On-line attack An attack against an authentication protocol where the attacker
either assumes the role of a claimant with a genuine verifier or
actively alters the authentication channel. The goal of the attack
may be to gain authenticated access or learn authentication se-
crets.
One-To-Many Synonym for ’Identification.’
One-To-One Synonym for ’Verification.’
Open-Set Identification Identification, when it is possible that the individual is not en-
rolled in the biometric system. Opposite of ’Closed-Set Identifi-
cation.’
Out Of Set In open-set identification, when the individual is not enrolled in
the biometric system.
Passive attack An attack against an authentication protocol where the attacker
intercepts data traveling along the network between the claimant
and verifier, but does not alter the data (for example eavesdrop-
ping).
Passive Impostor Ac-
ceptance
When an impostor submits his/her own biometric sample and
claiming the identity of another person (either intentionally or in-
advertently) he/she is incorrectly identified or verified by a bio-
metric system. Compare with ’Active Impostor Acceptance.’
Password A secret that a claimant memorizes and uses to authenticate his or
her identity. Passwords are typically character strings.
Performance Criteria Pre-determined criteria established to evaluate the performance of
the biometric system under test.
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Term Description
Personal Identification
Number (PIN)
A password consisting only of decimal digits.
Physical/Physiological
Biometric
A biometric which is characterized by a physical characteristic
rather than a behavioral trait.
Receiver Operating
Curves
A graph showing how the false rejection rate and false acceptance
rate vary according to the threshold.
Recognition The preferred term is ’Identification’.
Response Time The time period required by a biometric system to return a deci-
sion on identification or verification of a biometric sample.
Salt A non-secret value that is used in a cryptographic process, usually
to ensure that the results of computations for one instance cannot
be reused by an attacker.
Shared secret A secret used in authentication that is known to the claimant and
the verifier, for example a password.
Template/Reference
Template
Data which represents the biometric measurement of an enrollee
used by a biometric system for comparison against subsequently
submitted biometric samples.
Third Party Test An objective test, independent of a biometric vendor, usually car-
ried out entirely within a test laboratory in controlled environmen-
tal conditions.
Threshold/Decision
Threshold
The acceptance or rejection of biometric data is dependent on the
match score falling above or below the threshold. The threshold is
adjustable so that the biometric system can be more or less strict,
depending on the requirements of any given biometric applica-
tion.
Throughput Rate The number of end users that a biometric system can process
within a stated time interval.
Type I Error See ’False Rejection.’
Type II Error See ’False Acceptance.’
Token Something that the claimant possesses and controls (typically a
key or password) used to authenticate the claimants identity.
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User The client to any biometric vendor. The user must be differenti-
ated from the end user and is responsible for managing and imple-
menting the biometric application rather than actually interacting
with the biometric system.
Validation The process of demonstrating that the system under consideration
meets in all respects the specification of that system.
Verifier An entity, computer or system that verifies the claimants identity
by verifying the claimants possession of a token using an authen-
tication protocol. To do this, the verifier may also need to validate
credentials that link the token and identity and check their status.
Verification/Verify The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against
the biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose iden-
tity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the en-
rollee’s template. Contrast with ’Identification.’
Zero Effort Forgery An arbitrary attack on a specific enrollee identity in which the
impostor masquerades as the claimed enrollee using his or her
own biometric sample.
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Appendix B
Detailed Descriptions
B.1 Wilcoxon signed-rank test
The Wilcoxon signed rank test[54] is named after Frank Wilcoxon. It was origi-
nally used as a test to determine if two sample observations origin from the same
distribution. A popular use of this test is to evaluate a set of ranked questions
and answers. Imagine a set of questions with a multiple choice alternative from 1
through 4 (for example low to high or strongly disagree to strongly agree to ques-
tion statement). The harshness of each percipient in such a questionnaire could
differ. One way to know if two of the subject are agreeing disregarding their
harshness, is looking if their values go up or down (not looking at how high or
low the values selected are).
Ordering the samples and counting entries within defined value slots (chunks),
can reveal if the trend is similar or not for the two samples.
B.2 Accuracy and Precision
The most common analogy used to explain accuracy and precision is comparing
the measurements to arrows fired at a target. While accuracy describes the close-
ness of the arrows to the bullseye center, the closer to the center the arrows are, the
higher is the accuracy is. Precision on the other hand goes to describe how close
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the arrows are to each other, or the size of the cluster in which the arrows are scat-
tered. In the example of the bullseye, many arrows on the lower left hand side of
the target would be considered precise. The closer the arrows are to the bullseye,
the more accurate it is. And combined a high precision with high accuracy would
be the best dataset in both aspects.
One point to keep in mind is that the accuracy is somewhat dependent on preci-
sion. All measurements cannot be close to the bullseye, if the precision is low.
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Media Content
C.1 Thesis
Folder thesis contains this thesis.pdf document and the thesis.bib
file used in the bibliography.
C.2 Spread Sheets
In the calc folder, the spreadsheets used for preliminary testing and graphing
can be found. Most are in .xls (Microsoft Excel) format, however some .ods
(OpenOffice) files can also be found.
C.3 Figures
All figures generated or created in the process can be found in the fig folder.
Included is also the datafiles and gnuplot files used to generate the figures found
in the thesis.
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C.4 Login application
The entire C# login application can be found in the login_app folder. It can be
run using Visual Studios, and source can be read using any standard text editor.
C.5 Web application
Folder webapp contains the scripts used to calculate the profiles. It also con-
tains the test scripts used for all the tests conducted. It is written in ColdFusion,
a Adobe/Macromedia product, and needs ColdFusion server to run. It supports
Internet Information Services on Windows 98, XP, Vista, 2000 and 2000 Server,
and Apache for Windows or supported Linux distributions.
Figure C.1: Screenshot from the web-application front page
It needs the correct database ODBC connection setting to an available SQL server,
defined in the file Application.cfm. Though originally developed using Mi-
crosoft SQL Server, it also supports MySQL and several other database types.
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Figure C.2: Screenshot from the web-application example user profile page
C.6 Database
The folder database contains the .mdf and .ldf database files needed to at-
tach in MSSQLSERVER Enterprice Manager. The figure C.3 shows the structure
of the database. Each field and table is commented under the database informa-
tion. A section on the database can be found in section 4.4.4. It contains the raw
data from the logging scripts, and the samples filtered with the web-application.
It also contains all the profiles generated for all the terminal types for all users.
There are no sensitive data, like full names or personal information in any of the
tables.
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Figure C.3: Database table relationship structure
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